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Inefficiencies in private giving are a common occurrence in public good games. In this 
dissertation, we ask four questions: do subjects recognize the inefficiency due to the lack of 
coordination on group giving, is there a simple way to overcome this coordination problem, is 
there a mechanism for giving that improves group welfare that is preferred by subjects, and do 
subjects choose a predatory allocation strategy when given opportunities to discriminate. To 
investigate these questions, we design a public goods experiment where the contributions of each 
individual may be determined by a member of the group named the "agent." In the game with 
common wealth and preferences among the group, the dominant strategy for the agent is to 
choose the Pareto-efficient allocation.  Thus, giving through an agent in this environment 
eliminates the group coordination problem seen in private giving.   In the game with diversified 
wealth among the group, the dominant giving behavior for the agent becomes a predatory 
allocation strategy, where members of their own wealth group can free-ride off the contributions 
of the other wealth group. 
Using public good games with both boundary and interior Nash equilibria, results from 
the agent treatment are contrasted with results from a no-agent treatment. In addition, efficiency 
and allocation decisions are compared between the equal-endowment experiment and the 
diversified wealth experiment.  Subjects do recognize the inefficiency of individual giving to a 
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group, and therefore, higher contributions to the public good are observed under the agent 
treatment which improves social welfare.   
In a third chapter is presented which models an industry with two differentiated firms 
producing a homogenous product priced by contracts.  Each firm faces difficulty in pricing their 
product since they are competing in a market with two types of customers, "old" and "new."  
Two types of switching costs are considered, one explicit in the contract and another which is 
implicit.  We examine how prices and fees in contracts are affected by the parameter of the 
model including the spread and expected value of this implicit switching cost. 
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1.0  PRIVATE VS. PUBLIC PROVISION: AN EXPERIMENTAL INVESTIGATION 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1.1 Overview 
 How to most efficiently provide for society's welfare through the use of public goods is a 
question that has been on the minds of economists and politicians for decades.  Of particular 
concern is whether society is better off when public goods are privately or publicly provided.  
Numerous arguments can be made for or against pubic provision.  Although Pareto-efficient 
giving is virtually never observed in private giving games, coordination in giving has been 
consistently observed albeit at small amounts. 
Previous experimental literature has looked into the mystery of persistent coordination in 
private giving with discoveries that subjects give above predicted outcomes due to kindness, 
confusion, or because they are simply cooperative types (Andreoni 1995a, Fischbacher and 
Gachter 2006).  As subjects give less of their endowments to the public good with experience, 
the cooperation that was previously enjoyed within the group in early rounds becomes frustrated 
and ultimately fails.  This cooperation failure, according to these authors, comes from "frustrated 
attempts at kindness," general confusion, and the interaction of conditional-cooperators with 
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free-riders.  Thus, the use of an agent making a group contribution decision eliminates frustration 
and solves the coordination failure seen in private giving treatments. 
This paper is focused on a public good experiment which examines the possibility of 
efficient contribution through a group agent.  Specifically, a giving structure is implemented 
utilizing agents who make a single allocation decision for all members of their group.  By 
examining decisions made under private provision of a public good with those under agency, we 
are able to determine which is more efficient.  Under a voting condition, we can also determine 
which is more popular.  Subjects allocate tokens from their endowment into two accounts, a 
group account and a private account.  The "twist" to the traditional public good game is that in 
the agent treatment a player's allocation decision to the group account is for the group as a 
whole.   
Giving to public goods through an agent is theoretically efficient when every group 
member is endowed with the same wealth and unable to discriminate between individuals within 
the group.  In the agent's allocation problem, the Pareto-optimal level of the public good is not 
only the optimal response for a subject's allocation decision, but it is also a dominant strategy.  
This Pareto-optimal outcome is achieved due to the agent's ability to make a single, binding 
contribution decision.  This one decision eliminates the coordination problems often witnessed 
during private giving sessions.  Thus, agency increases social welfare over private provision. 
A natural question to ask is where do we see such agents?  Agents make a single, binding 
allocation decision for their group; thus, in government an agent is a dictator.  Agents are those 
who may make authoritative decisions that apply to a body of individuals under them or around 
them.  Examples of these agents are a president of a company, a manager of a task force, or even 
a parent in their own household.  In addition, there are certain environments where it is not 
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efficient for every individual in a group to have a voice; these are cases where group size makes 
it difficult to achieve beneficial outcomes.  We see these large group sizes in representative 
governments, corporations, and unions.  Such situations call for individuals to delegate their 
decision power to an agent to speak or make decisions on their behalf.  Specifically agency can 
be seen in the context of a class action lawsuit, where an individual plaintiff gives up their right 
to sue individually in order to allow a lawyer to pursue restitution for the group as a whole. 
When looking at the benefits of agency in public good games, it is only natural to wonder 
why these public mechanisms are not used more frequently.  Depending on the size of the group 
making a collective decision, having one centralized agent, such as the government, can bring 
about large inefficiencies in terms of administrative costs and special interest groups.  One goal 
of this paper is to investigate what would happen if all of the costs of centralization were stripped 
away.  Could efficiency in the public good be achieved if agents had a straightforward 
environment in which to make decisions?   
This experiment will attempt to answer this question by comparing within-subject results 
of private giving and allocations with an agent to see if greater efficiency and higher social 
welfare are achieved with the use of an agent.  Further, if subjects can vote for an allocation 
structure, which would be the majority outcome: agency or no-agency?  In a voting treatment 
after subjects have experienced giving under both the no-agent and agent treatments, they are 
given an institutional choice, which is then imposed by majority rule.  The allocation mechanism 
emerges endogenously in the voting treatment at the end each session. 
The experimental design is comprised of two allocation structures which yield different 
solutions to the player's giving problem.  In the previous public goods literature, most commonly 
the Nash equilibrium and Pareto-optimal outcome can be found on the boundary of a subject's 
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decision space.  In the experimental design, I provide results from a traditional boundary case as 
well as an interior case where the Nash equilibrium and Pareto-optimal outcome are interior to a 
subject's decision space.  This interior design provides room for players to not only over-
contribute but also under-contribute relative to both the Nash equilibrium and Pareto-efficient 
outcome.  The addition of the interior design also helps address the question of whether subjects 
can achieve the Pareto-optimal outcome in an environment where the solution is not as obvious 
as in the boundary design.  Agency, in theory, should solve all cooperative problems seen in 
private giving session, especially in the boundary solution.  The interior design with its greater 
complexity provides a further test upon the cooperative power of the agency treatment.  Will 
agents make less Pareto-optimal decisions in the interior solution than in the boundary due to its 
complexity? 
Results from the experimental design are mostly as expected in both solution cases.  
Social welfare and efficiency increase under the agent treatment due to higher contributions than 
in no-agent treatments.  In fact, by the end of the agent-treatment rounds, giving behavior 
approaches the respective Pareto-optimal outcomes, although more frequent Pareto-optimal 
outcomes are seen in the boundary solution.  In the boundary case, giving behavior in the no-
agent treatment deteriorates toward the Nash equilibrium of zero contribution.  In the interior 
case, there is no general decline in giving during no-agent rounds, but instead giving converges 
to a level slightly above the Nash equilibrium.  In both solution cases, voters always favor the 
agent contribution mechanism.  This results in even more frequent Pareto-optimal contribution 
decisions. 
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1.1.2 Literature review 
The literature on public good experiments is too large to summarize here.  For an overall survey 
see Ledyard (1995). 
The general trends in the literature about behavior in boundary VCM games are the 
following.  Individuals and groups do not behave as predicted contributing positive amounts of 
their endowment to the group account when the Nash equilibrium prescribes zero contribution.  
On the other hand, they do not make Pareto-optimal contributions to the public good.  Players in 
boundary VCM experiments usually invest amounts in between these two outcomes.  It may be 
argued that subjects extract some gains from giving to the public good, but they cannot exploit 
them to the fullest extent because of poor coordination within the group and incentives to free 
ride. 
Since economists have been interested in how to attain Pareto optimality in giving 
behavior in public good experiments, they have added various treatments to VCM games in an 
effort to facilitate efficient provision, eliminate free riding, and affect cooperation. These include 
methods of group pairing (Andreoni 1988;  Croson, 1996; Andreoni and Croson, 1998), 
sequential moves and signaling (Gachter and Renner, 2004; Meidinger and Villeval, 2002;  
Moxnes and van der Heijden, 2003; Potters et al. working paper, Potters et al. 2005), varying 
group size (Issac and Walker, 1988b), pre-play communication (Issac and Walker, 1988a; Frey 
and Bohnet, 1996; Ostrom, Walker and Gardner, 1992; Bochet, Page and Putterman, in press), 
punishments and rewards (Andreoni et al., 2003; Fehr and Gachter, 2000; Masclet et al. 2003), 
asymmetry of information, status (Kumru and Vesterlund, working paper) and even dynamic 
sequences of contributing (Duffy et al., working paper). These mechanisms often make 
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considerable improvements to efficient giving, but none of these has consistently brought about 
Pareto-optimal behavior in group decision making. 
The effect of leaders (whom I call agents) and their assistance in aiding groups to make 
efficient choices has just begun to be investigated in public goods experimental literature.  
Potters, Sefton, and van der Heijden (2005) investigate the significance of leaders in a team-
production experiment.  They compare a revenue-sharing treatment to a treatment with a team 
leader in an experiment with team production.  Under the revenue-sharing treatment, the total 
production is split evenly, whereas the leader has the power to implement their own allocation of 
the total production.  They find that the "presence of a team leader results in a significant 
improvement in team performance."  Their results show that leaders can improve efficiency in a 
group setting even when the leader has the discretionary reward power to take the entire team 
production for themselves or disperse it among the group.  Their design is very similar to a 
traditional VCM design since it maintains incentives to free-ride.  Having a leader does not 
remove this incentive unless they send appropriate signals through their allocations to help foster 
cooperation.  The leaders in their experiment are different than the agents in my experiment.  My 
agents' payoffs are tied up with their group decision, while in Potters et al., leaders can take the 
whole team production pie or encourage team production by their allocation.  Their leaders are 
making multiple allocation decisions, as opposed to the agents in my experiment who make a 
single allocation decision for themselves as a part of the group.  Their experiment has exciting 
results showing the benefits of a leader in a public good environment, but due to the differences 
in the payoff design and strategy for the leaders, their results have different implication than my 
experiment. 
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Duffy and Kim (2005) also exhibit the efficiency benefit of leaders (agents) in their 
experimental research in a predator-prey environment. Their results show that in treatments 
without a government agent, subjects coordinate on an inefficient equilibrium, but when they 
introduce a government agent to impose an irreversible group decision subjects can actually 
achieve a more efficient equilibrium.  Thus, government agents who are given power to make a 
binding decision can help their group reach better outcomes. 
In designing the mechanics of this experiment, I wanted to be able to compare my results 
to a design that had been already tested to replicate findings of similar studies.  This would 
ensure that the behavioral results are a product of the design and not the laboratory surroundings. 
Thus, the technicalities of the interior-solution experimental design are derived from an interior 
public good experiment conducted by Laury, Walker, and Williams (1999).1  In their design, 
each group consists of five members and both the Pareto optimal and Nash equilibrium solutions 
are interior to the decision space.  These design features are important to my experiment not only 
for the benefit of comparison but also because they allow for testing of both under- and over-
contribution to the public good.  The group composition of five members also allows group 
voting to utilize majority rule to implement outcomes.  In addition, the interior Nash and Pareto 
optimal solutions allow for an opportunity to watch contribution convergence.  Will players 
converge on Nash equilibrium behavior from above, below or even at all? In their experiment, 
LWW see over-contribution above the Nash equilibrium to the group account in all treatments 
with slight convergence from above, although contribution levels were still below the Pareto 
optimum and never fully converge. 
                                                 
1 References to the Laury, Walker, and Williams (1999) paper henceforth will be abbreviated LWW. 
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The agent design, though a simple change, can address some questions raised in the 
voluminous literature generated by the voluntary contribution mechanism.  Is it possible for one 
small modification in mechanism design could overcome all the inefficiencies in group-giving 
behavior?  Can group opinion affect decisions of representatives?  Also, does the choice of 
whether the group chooses to be under the guidance of an agent bring consistently improved 
outcomes?  If ever efficient outcomes are consistently to be seen in public good games, I would 
predict it would be in the environment of a single agent making a single, binding group 
contribution decision.  If we do not see them here, then we may easily be lead to believe that 
there is a good amount of confusion associated with the setup or players understanding the nature 
of the game as shown by Andreoni (1995a). 
1.2 EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN 
1.2.1 Basic Design 
The experiment follows a 2x3 design for a public good experiment.  Each session consists of 60 
decision rounds, 20 rounds of no-agent decisions, 20 rounds of agent decisions, and 20 rounds of 
voting decisions.2  These three environments are examined in both interior and boundary 
solutions designs.   
                                                 
2 The ordering between the first two treatments was reversed to check for ordering effects but the voting 
treatment remained as the last 20 rounds so subjects could decide which mechanism they would rather have after 
having experienced both the agent and no-agent treatments. 
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In all treatments, the group composition does not change across rounds, meaning the 
same group of n = 5 subjects play a finitely-repeated public good game over the course of the 60-
round experimental session.  Due to the slight complexity of the mathematics and search 
associated with the mechanics of the interior solution, the fixed pairings allow for increased 
cooperation and fewer distractions in strategy formation during the decision process.3  The set up 
of each session as well as Nash equilibrium allocations are presented in Table 1.  Both the 
interior and boundary designs consisted of 6 groups of 5 subjects for a total of 30 subjects per 
solution design. 
Table 1: Session Treatment Designs and Contribution Equilibria 
Session Name* Rounds 1-20 Rounds 21-40 Rounds 41-60 NA Prediction Agent Prediction 
BoundaryNA No Agent Agent Voting 
BoundaryAN Agent No Agent Voting 
0 125 
InteriorNA No Agent Agent Voting 
InteriorAN Agent No Agent Voting 
20** 84 
*Each session consisted of 3 groups of 5 subjects and is abbreviated by its solution design and the first treatment round. 
**Assumes each subject follows a symmetric giving strategy in order to achieve the Nash equilibrium of 100 tokens. 
     
At the beginning of each round, each subject is gifted with 125 tokens to allocate between 
one of two accounts: the group public account and their own private account.  Tokens cannot be 
carried between rounds.  When the round starts, each individual is asked how many tokens they 
want to allocate to the group account.  Tokens not contributed to the group account remain in a 
                                                 
3 Even though these fixed pairings allow for repeated game strategies to emerge among group members, 
behavior should not be affected by the matching strategy given the research done by Andreoni and Croson (2001).  
In addition, in looking at the results, it appears that the treatment variables and learning are driving the differences in 
giving behavior, but this remains an open question for further research. 
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subject's private account. The difference in the agent treatment is that each individual is asked to 
make an allocation decision for the group.  In each round in the agent treatment, each group 
member makes a single decision about how many of every group member's tokens will be 
contributed to the group account.  The agent's allocation decision is similar to a single, lump-sum 
tax applied to every group member, including themselves.  After all subjects have made agent 
decisions, one group member is chosen at random to be the agent whose decision is then 
implemented for the group.  
    Thus, the total number of tokens in the group account in the agent treatment is five 
times the amount the agent allocated.  For the no-agent treatment, the total number of tokens in 
the group account equals the sum of the tokens contributed individually by all group members. 
    In the last 20 rounds, subjects vote on whether they would like to have an agent make a 
group allocation decision or utilize the individual, no-agent mechanism.  Any voting mechanism 
should lead to the same result, given that it is best response for every member of the group to 
choose agency.   The voting method chosen in this experiment is majority rule in an effort to 
emulate a realistic environment which reflects how most group decisions are made.  In addition, 
as shown by Bowen (1969) and Bergstrom (1979), majority voting brings about a Pareto-optimal 
provision of a single public good when all voters have equal wealth and marginal rates of 
substitution.  Thus, the most frequent outcome of the voting treatment should be the agency 
mechanism with a Pareto-efficient allocation to the group account.   
Through voting, the allocation mechanism becomes endogenous to the group.   Group 
members can voice their opinion about what method they prefer.  If three or more group 
members vote for one outcome, it is imposed.  The numerical outcome of the vote is not revealed 
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to participants in an effort to avoid influencing giving behavior.  The outcome is only revealed 
by the allocation method which is implemented. 
    Participants were volunteers recruited from the University of Pittsburgh Experimental 
Economics Laboratory mailing list which include students and adults from the Pittsburgh area. 
All experimental sessions were conducted at the University of Pittsburgh Experimental 
Economics Laboratory. 
1.2.2 Payoff Design 
1.2.2.1 Boundary Design 
In the no-agent treatment, the unique Nash equilibrium prediction is zero contribution for all 
marginal per capital return (MPCR) rates less than one.  By contrast, in the agent treatment, the 
Nash equilibrium links to the Pareto optimum involving full contribution. At the beginning of 
each period, each of the n subjects is endowed with e tokens.  In each period, the agent decides to 
allocate t of each individual's endowment to the public good.  This allocation t is uniform across 
group members and therefore is not indexed by i.  Once an agent makes a decision for the group, 
it is binding for all group members.  Therefore, each player i acting as an agent must choose t to 
maximize his or her profits given by: 
(1)  anttei +−=π  in each period, where a is the marginal per capita return to 
the public good,  0 < a < 1< an. 
Maximizing (1) by t yields a boundary solution:                          Note that complete 
allocation of each group member’s endowment (t = e) follows from an >1.  The Pareto optimum 
of complete giving to the experimental public good is the dominant strategy for the agent.  Thus, 
the total number of tokens in the group account is ne.  Note, by maximizing his own profit, the 
.01 >+−= an
dt
d iπ
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agent is maximizing each member of the group's profits since (1) does not depend on i.  Due to 
the large increase in profits from the Pareto-optimal allocation strategy in the agent treatment, 
during voting rounds choosing agency is a dominant strategy for each group member. 
Since the interior solution is designed around parameters set by LWW, the boundary 
solution design structural components should be similar for the sake of comparison.  The most 
important structural design to match is the benefit of the Pareto optimal outcome over the Nash 
equilibrium outcome.   Therefore, in the boundary design, the ratio of the token payoff in the 
Pareto optimum over the token-payoff in the Nash equilibrium is the same as it is in the interior 
design.  This ratio of payoffs is the marginal per capita return (MPCR) of contributing to the 
group account since it will approximately measure the rate of return of the public good for each 
group member.  To find this ratio of payoffs, I determine the payoffs each subject would receive 
in the interior design from playing a symmetric Nash equilibrium of 20 tokens each and a Pareto 
optimum of 84 tokens each.  By taking the ratio of these payoffs, I find an MPCR of 0.318.  
Therefore, each token in the group account yields 2.2 points to every member of the group, and 
each token in a subject's private account yields them 0.7 points. 
Looking more specifically into the payoff design in the boundary case, at the beginning 
of each period, each of the 5 subjects is endowed with 125 tokens.  Thus, our specific agent's 
payoff function is: 
)5(7.0)(2.2 ttei +−=π  
).5(7.0)125(2.2 tti +−=π 
 12 
1.2.2.2 Interior Solution 
Recall that the mechanics of the interior solution are derived from the Laury, Walker, and 
Williams (1999) paper utilizing the details of their Z125-DET treatment.  The set up for the 
return to the group account for a subject is denoted by F(.), the group size, the endowments for 
each member, as well as parts of the instructions and tables given to the subjects were all 
employed from their interior design. 
This design adheres to the structure of a voluntary contribution mechanism where 
subjects decide how to allocate their endowment between their private and the group account.  At 
the beginning of each period, each of the five subjects is endowed with 125 tokens.  Each 
individual i decides how many of their tokens to allocate to the group account, gi.  Thus, the total 
number of tokens in the group account is  where ,
4
1
∑
=
+
j
ji gg .ij ≠      
Table 2: Synopsis of Solution Design 
 Boundary Interior 
   
F(X)* 1.59X 6.25X-0.00625X² 
   
F'(X)/N - MPCR 0.318 1.25-0.0025X 
   
Group NE 0 100 
   
Group PO 625 420 
   
Indiv. NE 0 20** 
   
Indiv. PO 125 84** 
   
*X denotes the number of tokens in the group account and F(X) dictates a function which shows 
group earnings from the group account. 
**The Nash and Pareto-optimal solutions in the interior design are in aggregate tokens.  These 
individual token amounts hypothesize behavior if all players acted the same. 
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The return to the group account for a subject is characterized by F(.) which is a non-
linear function with a declining benefit from the group account.  Each subject receives 
n
1
 or 
5
1  
of total group account earnings.  Therefore, each subject receives 
F g gi j( )+∑
5
j
 in points as 
their individual return from the group account.  Each token remaining in their private account 
earns a subject one point. 
Denote the number of tokens in the group account X.  The total of group earnings from 
the group account is; . Thus, the marginal social benefit from the 
group account is;  and the marginal per capita return (MPCR) is; 
200625.025.6)( XXXF −=
XXF 0125.025.6)(' −=
.0025.025.1)(' X
N
XF −=  
Using the same variables from the boundary analysis, if an agent chooses an allocation of 
t for each group member, then the payoff function for each individual i is: 
.
5
)5(125)( tFt
N
NtFtei +−=+−=π  
Figure 1 shows a graphic representation of the individual and group benefits and costs of 
placing a token in the group account.  The marginal cost of allocating one token to the group 
account is the one point that could have been earned from placing the token in the private 
account.  That same token can also be placed in the group account generates returns not only for 
the individual player in the form of their marginal private benefit but also to the group in the 
form of the marginal social benefit.   
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  Quantity of Tokens in Group Account 
Token 
Benefit/ 
Cost 
Figure 1: Interior Nash and Pareto Optimal Outcomes (from LWW) 
Thus, setting the marginal cost equal to marginal private benefit yields a Nash 
equilibrium provision for the group of 100 tokens.  Similarly, setting marginal cost equal to 
marginal social benefit generates a group Pareto optimum provision of 420 tokens.  It is 
important to note that these solutions are in aggregate contributions.  Therefore, there exists a 
continuum of individual best-response strategies to behavior on the part of their group members’ 
decisions to reach these optimal contribution levels.  All players have the same endowment of 
125 tokens, and agents make a single allocation decision for the group.  Therefore, all agents will 
seek to maximize social benefit.  At the optimum, each agent should be making an allocation 
decision of 84 tokens for each member of his or her group.  Higher allocations should be seen in 
the agent treatment than in the no-agent treatment, where if all subjects are behaving 
symmetrically, they would each give 20 tokens to the group account to form a Nash equilibrium. 
The interior, Nash-equilibrium environment is more complex than the boundary solution.  
Subjects no longer face a Nash equilibrium that is unique on the individual level or involves a 
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dominant strategy.  Thus, there exists a coordination issue involved in reaching the unique 
aggregate Nash equilibrium since there are many individual Nash outcomes.  Additionally, the 
complex MPCR in the non-linear case makes the calculation of the solutions more difficult than 
in the boundary condition.   
Therefore, participants are given detailed information on the payoff structure of the 
experiment in the form of payoff tables in order to compare group and individual returns to 
specific contributions to the group account (see Appendix C).  These are provided in addition to 
the written instructions and were given to each participant.  The tables are reviewed by the 
experimenter along with the instructions before the beginning of the experiment.  Included in 
these tables is information on the additional return to the group and the additional return to the 
individual for contribution to the group account as well as examples of earnings from the group 
account. 
Subjects were given questionnaires in every treatment to test their understanding of the 
instructions and the environment.  Participants demonstrated high levels of understanding of the 
interior and boundary environments.  In addition, the questionnaire and answers were carefully 
reviewed with the subjects to further ensure understanding. 
1.2.2.3 Payment 
At the end of the experiment, participants were paid in private for their earnings in one randomly 
chosen period during their experimental session.  Paying participants for one period rather than 
all of their decisions is chosen in order to avoid wealth effects throughout the experiment.  Points 
are converted to dollars in the following fashion.  In the interior-solution design 1 point = 0.05 
dollars and in the boundary-solution design 1 point = 0.03 dollars.   The difference in payment 
comes from the increased difficulty of the interior-solution case and consequently its longer 
 16 
sessions.  Boundary-solution sessions often lasts between an hour to an hour and a half, and 
interior-solution sessions lasts approximately just under two hours.  All participants also earn a 
five dollar participation bonus.  Thus, average earnings are around $13-15 in the boundary-
solution sessions and $19-21 in the interior-solution sessions. 
1.3 PREDICTIONS 
We predict that, 
Hypothesis 1: In treatments with an agent, the efficient allocation is more likely than in 
treatments without an agent. 
In no-agent rounds, the individual incentive to reach the efficient, Pareto-optimal group 
allocation does not exist, since subjects would prefer to free-ride off the contributions of their 
group members.4  Because there is no incentive to give efficiently, Pareto optimal decisions 
should not be seen in no-agent rounds.   
In contrast, each agent has both the individual and group incentive to allocate the 
efficient, Pareto-optimal amount of tokens to the group account, and thus, this efficient-giving 
behavior should be seen frequently throughout agent rounds.  Although theory predicts that 
efficient allocation should be chosen in every round, the outcomes depend entirely on the 
rationality of the representative and their understanding of the payoffs of the game.  Therefore, 
outcomes in the agent treatment may vary depending on subjects' understanding of the game.  If 
                                                 
4 Contributions are still necessary to reach the Nash equilibrium in the interior solution.  Free-riding 
behavior still exists in this solution set up above Nash equilibrium contributions. 
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agents are not confident in making efficient allocations for the public good initially, then I would 
expect that as rounds continue, learning (either from experience or from other players) will take 
place, and players would gain confidence in making fully efficient choices.  Especially in the 
boundary-solution case, I would expect almost every agent allocation decision to be 125 tokens 
for each member of the group by the end of the 20 rounds since it is more easily understood than 
the interior solution. 
Corollary: Agent allocations should be higher than no-agent allocations. 
Due to their increased incentives to make higher contributions, agents should make 
higher contributions to the group account.  Additionally, in the agent treatment, there no longer 
exists the incentive to free ride, therefore higher contributions yield higher payoffs. 
Hypothesis 2: The majority of votes will vote to have an agent make the group's 
allocation decision. 
Due to predicted increased giving amounts and more frequent efficient allocations, 
individual and group profits in the agent treatment should be higher than profits in the no-agent 
treatment. If subjects expect payoffs similar to previous treatment rounds, they should follow the 
increase in profits with their vote to have an agent.  Thus, we should see agency emerge as the 
giving mechanism of choice in every round during the voting treatment. 
1.4 RESULTS 
The interior no-agent decisions are similar to the experimental findings of LWW.  Because the 
interior-solution design is based upon the previous work of LWW, it is important to compare the 
interior experimental findings with their results. The interior no-agent design mimics the Z125-
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DET treatment from the LWW paper where they found an average contribution of 43.31 tokens 
with a median of 45 and a standard deviation of 33.07.  With these sample estimates, a 95% 
confidence interval for the expectation of the population mean can be calculated yielding (39.57, 
47.05).  Their Z125-DET treatment should be compared to my interior no-agent decisions that 
occupy the first 20 rounds since subjects have not experienced or been influence by any other 
treatment during the course of the session.  These no-agent first decisions have a slightly higher 
average contribution of 49.96 with a median of 44.5 and a standard deviation of 35.56.  In 
constructing a 95% confidence interval of the population mean from my results, I find an interval 
of (45.96, 53.96) around the sample mean.  Even though the interior no-agent sample mean does 
not lie in the confidence interval for LWW sample, the confidence intervals overlap, sharing 
contribution values in common.  This implies that the results are similar within a 5% level of 
confidence, allowing us to draw the conclusion that behavior in the interior design is not driven 
by experimenter effects but by the experimental environment. 
Giving in the boundary no-agent design closely mimicked results in previous public good 
games.  The trends on giving during the no-agent boundary design follow the same patterns as 
seen in a host of public good experimental literature.  Mainly, contributions start high and 
deteriorate toward the Nash equilibrium contribution of zero as rounds increase.  In Figure 2, this 
behavioral trend can easily be identified. 
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Figure 2: Boundary No-Agent Contributions by Session 
    The literature in linear public good games is quite large, thus I will compare my results 
to Issac, Walker, and Thomas (1984) which was the first public good experiment testing the 
effects of group size and different MPCR rates.  Their experiment is a benchmark upon which a 
whole wealth of literature on public goods is founded. With a group size of 4 and an MPCR of 
0.3, Issac, Walker, and Thomas showed average contribution rates among players of 19% over 
10 rounds.  Although group size in my experiment is 5 and the MPCR is 0.318, my results are 
comparable.5
The average contribution rate is 20% over 20 boundary no-agent rounds.  At the 
bookends of that same session, IWT found a contribution rate of 43% in the first round and 17% 
                                                 
5 Issac, Walker, and Thomas will henceforth be abbreviated as IWT. 
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in the last round.  In the first no-agent round, the average contribution rate is 40%, and after 20 
rounds the contribution rate drops to 9%.  Although there are many design differences between 
my experiment and IWT, contribution rates for the standard linear contribution game are similar.   
Social welfare increases under the agent treatment compared to the no-agent treatment.  
The use of an agent to reduce the problems associated with free-riding can greatly increase 
overall social welfare.  If the benefits to an agent are not appreciated or understood by the group, 
then the change in giving-mechanism will not be effective at benefiting the group.   
Table 3: Comparison of Social Wealth Changes by Session (in average profits per player) 
Session No Agent Agent Voting
BoundaryNA 297.8 399.4 420.4 
BoundaryAN 313.6 406.0 429.4 
InteriorNA 304.8 325.7 328.3 
InteriorAN 304.1 316.8 321.0 
 
Changes in social welfare are measured in average profits per player as shown in Table 3.  
Overall, profits per player increase in the agent treatment over the no-agent treatment and rise 
even further from the agent treatment to the voting treatment.  These increases in profit are 
especially statistically significant in the boundary design sessions using one-sided Wilcoxon 
signed rank tests comparing each player's average profits from the no-agent treatment to the 
agent treatment and also from the agent treatment to the voting treatment.   We can reject the null 
hypothesis that average profits are the same in the no-agent and the agent treatment since the p-
vale of this test is 0.000.  The null hypothesis that average profits are the same in the boundary 
agent and voting rounds can also be rejected with a p-value of 0.000.  These one-sided signed 
rank rests using data from the InteriorNA design session demonstrate results that reject the null 
hypothesis that average profits are the same in the no-agent treatment and the agent treatment 
with a p-value of 0.0176.  In the InteriorAN sessions, the null hypothesis that no-agent and agent 
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average profits are the same could not be rejected at the 10% level.  In general, group members 
are earning higher profits in agent rounds increasing social welfare compared to no-agent rounds.   
In the final rounds of the session, there is no "drop off" in interior design no-agent 
decisions while this drop-off in giving is present in the boundary no-agent decisions.  As 
mentioned previously, in traditional private-giving games, contributions to the group account 
start off high and experience large declines toward the Nash equilibrium as rounds increase.  
Even though the Nash equilibrium of the interior solution calls for contributions to take place in 
all rounds, we would still expect the general allocation trend decline to hold as subjects learn 
from the experimental environment and attempt to coordinate contributions with other group 
members.  Thus, we would expect to see higher than Nash giving in early rounds and a decline in 
giving toward the Nash equilibrium as the rounds elapse. 
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Figure 3: Interior No-Agent Contributions By Session 
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However in all interior-design treatments, there is no decline in contribution behavior in 
the final rounds of the no-agent treatment.  No-agent giving behavior in the interior design 
sessions is shown in Figure 3.  As the 20 rounds of no-agent decisions elapse in the interior 
design, individual contribution behavior does not significantly change.  While in the boundary 
design, as the 20 rounds come to a close a large decline in contribution behavior is clearly 
visible.  Some explanations for this deviation from typical contribution behavior in the interior-
solution case are that group members might be continuing attempts to coordinate when the 20 
rounds end, the overall lack of understanding of the payoff structure, or since the mathematic 
structure is more complicated than the boundary design, attempts at kindness may not have 
become frustrated yet.  The environmental factors are simplified in the boundary design in which 
the standard drop-off toward Nash equilibrium behavior is observed. 
Observation 1: Consistent with hypothesis 1, agent allocations are greater than no-agent 
allocations, specifically they are closer to the group efficient Pareto optimum.  
Figure 4 shows the results of the pooled data between all agent and no-agent contribution 
decisions during the first and last five rounds of the first treatment in each session.  The gap 
between the agent and no-agent allocations becomes even wider in the last 5 rounds of decisions 
than was already present in the first five rounds.  This result is very dramatic in the boundary 
condition, as expected since the distance between the Pareto optimal and Nash equilibrium 
contribution level is greater in this design.   
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Figure 4: First Five vs. Last Five Rounds of First Treatment in all 4 session types 
Although agent allocations are greater than no-agent allocations in all designs and 
rounds, they do not fully reach Pareto optimal levels as predicted would occur by the end of the 
treatment rounds.  On average, agent allocations come quite close to group optimal levels in 
these results (within approximately 8 tokens in each solution design).   
This gap between agent and no-agent giving decisions can also be seen in Table 4 which 
shows overall means, medians, and standard deviations in contribution behavior in both the 
interior and boundary cases.  Agent allocation decisions approach Pareto optimality as seen 
especially when comparing results from the first 20 rounds of both agent and no-agent 
treatments.  In both solution designs, a 95% confidence interval around the pooled means for 
agent decisions do not contain the solution’s Pareto-optimal allocation.  However, the medians 
for the interior pooled agent and boundary agent decisions exactly pinpoint the Pareto-efficient 
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provision of the group account.  These approximately Pareto-efficient allocations to the group 
account combined with greater social welfare shows that the agent treatment attains greater 
efficiency for the public good than the no-agent treatment. 
Table 4: Data for Treatments 
Treatment # of Obs* Mean Median Standard Dev. Range 
      
Interior      
No Agent (first)** 300 49.96 44.5 35.557 0 to 125 
No Agent (pooled) 600 49.492 49.5 33.809 0 to 125 
Agent (first)*** 300 71.809 80 25.331 0 to 125 
Agent (pooled) 600 74.177 84 23.243 0 to 125 
Voting 600 73.037 84 24.006 0 to 110 
      
Boundary      
No Agent (first)** 300 17.553 5 29.391 0 to 125 
No Agent (pooled) 600 26.202 5 39.603 0 to 125 
Agent (first)*** 300 100.23 125 37.532 0 to 125 
Agent (pooled) 600 99.187 125 39.488 0 to 125 
Voting 600 114.99 125 28.89 0 to 125 
      
*Number of observations = (# of rounds) * (# of replications) * (# of individuals in each group). 
**Presents results from within no-agent treatment when no-agent decisions occupy first 20 rounds 
***Presents results from within agent treatment when agent decisions occupy first 20 rounds 
 
Further evidence of the difference between agent and no-agent allocation decisions can 
be confirmed by two-sided Wilcoxon Mann-Whitney (MW) tests, which reveal large differences 
between contribution mechanisms as seen in Table 5. Mann-Whitney rank sum tests form a null-
hypothesis that two samples are drawn from the same population and therefore have equivalent 
probability distributions.  I performed these MW tests to ensure that average individual 
contribution decisions from agent and no-agent rounds are from decidedly different samples and 
different populations. The p-values for the effect of agency on all interior and boundary pooled 
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data are significant (0.000), meaning agent and no-agent decisions belong to decidedly different 
populations.6
Table 5: Two Sided Wilcoxon Mann-Whitney Test P-values 
Boundary Contribution Decisions Agency First 
Pooled Agent vs. NA  0.000  
Agent First vs. Second  0.518 
No Agent First vs. Second  0.065 
   
Interior Contribution Decisions Agency First 
Pooled Agent vs. NA  0.000  
Agent First vs. Second  0.443 
No Agent First vs. Second  0.917 
     
In addition to these agent pooled MW test results, I find an order-effect in boundary no-
agent decisions.  The no-agent decisions that come first are significantly different from the no-
agent decisions that come second.  If the no-agent decisions occupy the second 20 rounds of the 
session, then the subjects have seen the value of increased giving to the public good under the 
agent treatment and therefore try to coordinate on higher values of giving throughout the 20 no-
agent rounds.  No other order effects are present. 
Observation 2: Consistent with hypothesis 2, agency was the overwhelming majority 
outcome when choosing a mechanism of contribution to the public good. 
Because of both the increased individual and social wealth in the agent treatments, I 
would expect that every player would prefer to have an agent make a contribution decision for 
the group instead of playing the no-agent treatment where group coordination problems are 
always prevalent.  In the 600 opportunities for subjects to place a vote in the interior-design 
                                                 
6 These p-values represent at what percentage of confidence one can reject the null hypothesis that the two 
samples are drawn from the same population. 
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treatments, agents are chosen 75.17% of the time. Agency is the majority voting outcome 
96.67% of the time.  "No-agent" is selected only by one group at the onset of the voting rounds 
for 4 rounds.  Similarly, in the boundary-design treatments, there were also 600 opportunities for 
subjects to cast their vote, and agency is chosen 82.3% of the time. Agency is the majority voting 
outcome 99.2% of the time.  Only once is "no-agent" selected in this design.  Therefore, not only 
did subjects recognize the benefits of having a group agent, but they preferred to have an agent 
decide contribution behavior to the group account. 
Agent decisions in voting rounds approach (and quite often attain) the Pareto optimal 
outcome.  The contribution decisions made during voting rounds are even higher than previous 
agent contributions during the same experimental session.  Reasons for the increased giving 
behavior are familiarity with the experimental design by the end of the experiment, learning from 
the previous 40 rounds, and a boost to agent confidence in decision making from the vote.  This 
added certainty is accomplished through group approval.  Thus, agents in these last 20 rounds, 
having the benefit of learning from the previous agent and no-agent treatments, are more likely 
to make group-beneficial decisions. 
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Figure 5: Boundary Contribution Choices by Frequency 
For evidence of this increase in giving behavior in voting rounds, see Figures 5 and 6 
which show the frequencies of contribution behavior by treatment in both the boundary and 
interior-solution designs.  In both solution designs, Pareto-optimal allocations are more 
frequently chosen in the agent treatment than in the no-agent treatment (confirming hypothesis 
1).  In addition, the frequency of contributions in the voting treatment in the interval near the 
Pareto optimum of both designs is higher than in the agent condition.  For further evidence of the 
increased optimal contribution behavior in the voting treatment, please see Figures 7 through 10 
in Appendix D which show allocation averages by group and session in both the interior and 
boundary designs. 
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Figure 6: Interior Contribution Choices by Frequency 
1.5 CONCLUSION 
As seen here and in the earlier literature, when groups are privately giving to a public good, 
subjects do not achieve Pareto optimal outcomes either due to lack of understanding of the 
optimal choice or group coordination failure.  In this experimental environment, using the agent 
mechanism, we remove the problem of free-riding, simplifying a subject's dominant strategy to 
an efficient allocation.  Therefore, the agent treatment can easily test if subjects understand the 
benefit of Pareto-optimal giving or if there exists confusion in the experimental environment.  
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The optimal giving seen in agent rounds provides evidence against confusion being the culprit of 
efficient giving in private environments.   
Agents in general made more optimal choices and improved group outcomes over 
individuals contributing to the pubic good.  In both solutions, agents are more likely to make 
Pareto-optimal outcomes with higher frequency given the reinforcement of a group vote and the 
learning taking place throughout the experiment’s 60 rounds.   
As for the mechanism of contribution, overwhelmingly subjects back agency with their 
vote.  Since the benefits of the public good can be best exploited under the agency mechanism, 
group members are willing to support it with their vote and pave the way for agents to make 
efficient group decisions. 
Thus, opportunities to have a centralized agency make contribution decisions for the 
public good should increase efficiency in the allocation structure for the good.  We could 
experience the added benefits of agency in tax structures by the government who decides how 
much each household must contribute for a given public program to succeed.  The benefits of 
this agent system can also be found in other organizations that are able to make binding 
allocation decisions for a good that will be enjoyed by all its members.  These organizations can 
be as small as a tour group deciding how much to tip their guide or a neighborhood deciding how 
much to contribute to form a neighborhood watch program. 
This experiment is a first step in understanding the affect of agency (or dictatorship) on 
group opinion and decision-making.  But the question remains, can the efficiency seen in agent 
rounds be carried over to an environment where there exists group heterogeneity?  In order to 
address this question, we need to look further into who these agents are and what incentives they 
have to make their group decisions.  Do agents in this experiment make efficient decisions 
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because they cannot discriminate between group members? The experiment above is not 
equipped to answer these questions since all subjects are effectively the same, facing the same 
endowment and the same preferences, and the agent makes one allocation decision for all group 
members.  Therefore, looking into the agent's problem and exploring some experimental 
extensions is a natural next move.  Endowing the subjects with a distribution of wealth and 
allowing the agent to make an allocation decision for each wealth type should provide an 
opportunity for agents to discriminate among wealth types in the group while confronting issues 
of fairness.  In creating disparity among group members in their wealth levels, it will be 
interesting to see if groups are able to attain Pareto-optimal outcomes and which mechanism for 
allocation, agent or no-agent, will be more popular among different wealth types. 
These questions are interesting to answer because when we think about the frequency of 
our choices, there are a multitude of occasions when we do not make decisions for ourselves.  In 
these circumstances, we can only hope that our agents are making the most optimal choices for 
the goods we collectively enjoy. 
1.6     APPENDICES 
1.6.1 Appendix A 
The following is the instructions for the first twenty rounds of the interior no-agent treatment 
with the agent changes in brackets. 
This is an experiment in decision making. The Department of Economics has provided 
funds for this research. During the course of the experiment, you will make a series of decisions. 
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You will be paid for participating, and the amount of money you earn depends on the decisions 
that you and the other participants make. At the end of today's session you will be paid privately 
and in cash for your decisions. Please do not talk to one another for the duration of the 
experiment. 
The first phase of the experiment will consist of 20 rounds. When these rounds have 
elapsed, please wait for further instruction. 
At the beginning of the experiment, everyone is randomly assigned to a group of 5 
individuals in the first round. During the course of the experiment, your group composition does 
not change. You will be in a group with the same 4 other members for the experiment. All 
decisions you make in this experiment are anonymous; therefore, please do not reveal any of 
your decisions to any other participant. 
At the beginning of each round, each of you will be gifted with 125 tokens. These tokens 
can be invested between two accounts: the group account and your own private account. When 
each round starts, you will be asked to make a decision [for the group] about how many tokens 
you would like to allocate to the group account. Tokens not contributed to the group account 
remain in your private account. The number of tokens in the group account equals the total of all 
the tokens contributed by all 5 members of your group at the end of the round. 
[After each member of the group has made decisions about token allocations, then one 
member will be chosen at random to be the group agent and their decision about the group 
allocation will be implemented. Thus, the number of tokens in the group account equals the 5 
times the amount the agent decides each person will contribute.] 
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An individual's earnings are determined from the number of tokens left in their private 
account and the total number of tokens in the group account. The total earnings from the group 
account are divided equally among all five individuals in the group. 
For each token remaining in your private account at the end of the round, you earn 1 
point. If you [the agent has] have decided to allocate X number of tokens to the group account, 
then you have 125-X tokens remaining private account. These tokens earn you (125-X) points. 
Earnings from the group account are decided according to an equation, which you do not 
need to know. Further explanation about earnings from the group account will follow. 
Remember, the total number of tokens in the group account equals the total of all the 
tokens contributed by all members of your group. We'll denote the total number of group account 
tokens by Y [5*X]. 
Total (in points) from the group account are: 
20025.025.6 YY −  
Your share in those earnings is one-fifth. Therefore, your individual earnings from the 
group accounts are (in points):  
  
5
0025.025.6 2YY −  
Attached are two tables to aid in understanding how this payoff function works with the 
125 token gift given to each of you at the beginning of each period. The first shows group and 
individual earnings from various token allocations to the group account. The second shows 
examples of possible earnings from the group account. 
Consider first the group's earnings from the group account. Table 1 (which is table 8 in 
this text) displays information on the group's per-token earnings from the group account. 
Beginning with the first token, each additional token allocated to the group account will increase 
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the group's earnings from this account by a smaller amount than the token before it. For example, 
the 1st token allocated to the group account earns 6.238 points for the group as a whole. The 2nd 
token allocated to the group account earns an additional 6.225 points for the group as a whole. 
The 99th token allocated to the group account earns an additional 5.013 points for the group as a 
whole, and so on. 
The 420th token allocated to the group account earns an additional 1.000 point for the 
group as a whole. Thus, the additional return to the group as a whole from the allocation of this 
token to the group account is the same as the return the individual who allocated this token 
would have received if it had been allocated to the private account. If more than 420 tokens are 
allocated to the group account, each additional token allocated to the group account increases 
earnings for the group as a whole by a smaller amount than the alternative option of allocating 
this token to the private account. The 500th token allocated to the group account earns a zero 
additional return to the group as a whole. Beyond 500 tokens, each additional token decreases 
earnings from the group account. 
Now consider the individual's earnings from the group account. Table 1 (which is table 9 
in this text) displays information on each individual's per-token earnings from the group account. 
Beginning with the first token, each additional token allocated to the group account will increase 
each individual's earnings from this account by a smaller amount than the token before it. For 
example, the 1st token allocated to the group account earns 1.248 points for each individual in 
the group. The 2nd token allocated to the group account earns an additional 1.245 points for each 
individual in the group. The 99th token allocated to the group account earns an additional 1.003 
points for each individual in the group, and so on. 
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The 100th token allocated to the group account earns an additional 1.000 point for each 
individual in the group. Thus, the additional return to each individual from the allocation of this 
token to the group account is the same as the return the individual who allocated this token 
would have received if it had been allocated to the private account. If more than 100 tokens are 
allocated to the group account, each additional token allocated to the group account increases 
earnings for each individual in the group by a smaller amount than the alternative option of 
allocating this token to the private account. The 500th token allocated to the group account earns 
a zero additional return to each individual. Beyond 500 tokens, each additional token decreases 
earnings from the group account. 
Consider how this information is related to the earnings information on your computer 
screen and on Table 2. The first 39 tokens allocated to the group account earn 234.2 points for 
the group as a whole. When an additional 39 tokens are allocated to the group account (for a total 
of 78 tokens), the group's earnings from this account increase 215.3 points. Thus the group's 
earnings increase by a smaller amount as more tokens are allocated to this account. 
The first 39 tokens allocated to the group account earn 46.8 points for each individual in 
the group. When an additional 39 tokens are allocated to the group account (for a total of 78 
tokens), each individual's earnings from the group account increases 43.1 points. Thus, each 
individual's earnings increase by a smaller amount as more tokens are allocated to this account. 
An Example: In the first round, your contribution decision was 80 tokens. The other 4 
members of your group made contribution decisions of 55, 104, 120, and 32. Therefore the group 
account has 80 + 55 + 104 + 120 + 32 = 391. Earnings from the group account are: 
 = 1488 points. 2)391(00625.0)391(25.6 −
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As one of 5 group members, you will receive one-fifth of total group earnings. Therefore 
your share of total group earnings is 298 points. 
This whole example is different in the agent treatment since only the agent's decision 
matters (see below). 
 [An Example: In the first round, your contribution decision as the agent of the group was 
77 tokens. The other 4 members of your group made agent contribution decisions of 91, 104, 
120, and 32. Only one agent will be randomly chosen from you group of 5, and after all 
decisions were made the member who chose 91 tokens was randomly picked to be the leader. 
Thus, everyone must contribute 91 tokens to the group account. Therefore the group account has 
5*91 = 455 tokens. Total group earnings are: 
 points. 1549.85)455(00625.0)455(25.6 2 =−
As one of 5 group members, you will receive one-fifth of total group earnings. Therefore 
your share of total group earnings is 309.97 points.] 
Your total payoff for each round is the sum of your earnings from the private and the 
group account, and will indicated on your computer screen. Earnings from the group account 
depend only on the total number of tokens in that account. 
Your earnings from the experiment will be drawn from the decisions from one round out 
chosen at random plus the $5 show up fee. The exchange rate for points to dollars is 1 point=3 
cents. Thus, 300 points=$9. At the end of the experiment, you will be asked to come to the side 
room where you will be paid in private. 
During the experiment, you are not permitted to speak or communicate with the other 
participants. If you have a question while the experiment is going on, please raise your hand and 
one of us will come to your desk and answer it. At this time, do you have any questions about the 
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instructions or procedures? If you have a question, please raise your hand and one of us will 
come to your seat and answer it. 
1.6.2 Appendix B: Questionnaires 
    Questionnaire -- Part 1 
    1. (True or False) The group earns more when there are 78 tokens in the account than when 
there are 195 tokens in the account (hint: look at Table 2).7
    2. (True or False) The group's additional earnings are higher with 140 tokens in the group 
account than with 380 tokens in the group account (hint: look at Table 1).8
    3.   What is your individual additional return for the 420th token placed in the group account? 
    4.   (True or False) Players remain in the same group of 5 players in all rounds. 
    5.   If the chosen agent of the group decides each individual contributes 81 tokens to the group 
account, how many tokens will be in the group account at the end of the period? 
     a.   How many tokens are in your private account? 
    6.   (True or False) Each player makes an allocation decision for the group every round but 
only one allocation is chosen. 
    Questionnaire -- Part 2 
    1. If all of the other members of the group together allocate 185 tokens to the group account 
and you allocate 45, how many tokens will be in the group account at the end of the period? 
     a.   How many tokens are in your private account? 
                                                 
7 which is table 8 in this text 
8 which is table 9 in this text 
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    2. (True or False) Tokens in the group account are from the individual allocation decisions 
from each of the members in your group. 
    Questionnaire -- Part 3 
    1.   (True or False) If 3 members of your group decide not to have an agent and 2 members 
decide to have an agent, then the group proceeds to make group allocation decisions and one is 
randomly selected to be implemented. 
    2.   (True or False) If one outcome receives 3 or more votes, it is the majority outcome and 
will be implemented. 
    3.   (True or False) No matter if the group decision outcome is for an agent, I make an 
allocation decision in every period. 
1.6.3 Appendix C: Tables Given to Subjects 
Tables 6 and 7 were given to subjects depending on whether it was given in a no-agent or agent 
environment. They were used to help aid subjects in understanding the interior solution 
environment.  In addition, subjects were given table 8 to give examples of possible earnings from 
different allocations to the group account. 
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 Table 6: Examples of possible earnings from the group account (in points) 
Tokens in the group 
account 
Additional 
tokens 
Total group 
earnings 
Group's 
additional 
earnings 
Your 20% 
share of 
group 
earnings 
Your 
additional 
earnings 
      
0 - 0 - 0 - 
39 39 234.2 234.2 46.84 46.84 
78 39 449.5 215.3 89.9 43.06 
117 39 645.7 196.2 129.14 39.24 
156 39 822.9 177.2 164.58 35.44 
195 39 981.1 158.2 196.22 31.64 
234 39 1120.3 139.2 224.06 27.84 
273 39 1240.4 120.1 248.08 24.02 
313 39 1343.9 103.5 268.78 20.7 
352 39 1425.6 81.7 285.12 16.34 
391 39 1488.2 62.6 297.64 12.52 
430 39 1531.9 43.7 306.38 8.74 
469 39 1556.5 24.6 311.30 4.92 
508 39 1562.1 5.6 312.42 1.12 
547 39 1548.7 -13.4 309.74 -2.68 
586 39 1516.3 -32.4 303.26 -6.48 
625 39 1464.8 -51.5 292.96 -10.3 
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Table 7: No-Agent Per Token Earnings from the Group Account 
Tokens 
allocated 
to the 
group 
account 
Group's 
additional  
return 
Individual's 
additional 
return 
(20% of 
group's 
return) 
Tokens 
allocated 
to the 
group 
account 
Group's 
additional  
return 
Individual's 
additional 
return 
(20% of 
group's 
return) 
Tokens 
allocated 
to the 
group 
account 
Group's 
additional  
return 
Individual's 
additional 
return 
(20% of 
group's 
return) 
           
1 6.238 1.248 259 3.019 0.604 519 -0.231 -0.046 
2 6.225 1.245 260 3.006 0.601 520 -0.244 -0.049 
3 6.213 1.243 261 2.994 0.599 521 -0.256 -0.051 
           
19 6.019 1.204 279 2.769 0.554 539 -0.481 -0.096 
20 6.006 1.201 280 2.756 0.551 540 -0.494 -0.099 
21 5.994 1.199 281 2.744 0.549 541 -0.506 -0.101 
           
39 5.769 1.154 299 2.513 0.503 559 -0.731 -0.146 
40 5.756 1.151 300 2.500 0.500 560 -0.744 -0.149 
41 5.744 1.149 301 2.488 0.498 561 -0.756 -0.151 
           
59 5.519 1.104 319 2.269 0.454 579 -0.981 -0.196 
60 5.506 1.101 320 2.256 0.451 580 -0.994 -0.199 
61 5.494 1.099 321 2.244 0.449 581 -1.006 -0.201 
           
79 5.269 1.054 339 2.019 0.404 599 -1.231 -0.246 
80 5.256 1.051 340 2.006 0.401 600 -1.244 -0.249 
81 5.244 1.049 341 1.994 0.399 601 -1.256 -0.251 
           
99 5.013 1.003 359 1.769 0.354 619 -1.481 -0.296 
100 5.000 1.000 360 1.756 0.351 620 -1.494 -0.299 
101 4.998 0.998 361 1.744 0.349 621 -1.506 -0.301 
           
119 4.769 0.954 379 1.519 0.304 625 -1.556 -0.3112 
120 4.756 0.951 380 1.506 0.301     
121 4.744 0.949 381 1.494 0.299     
           
139 4.519 0.904 399 1.263 0.253     
140 4.506 0.901 400 1.250 0.250     
141 4.494 0.899 401 1.238 0.248     
           
159 4.269 0.854 419 1.013 0.203     
160 4.256 0.851 420 1.000 0.200     
161 4.244 0.849 421 0.998 0.198     
           
179 4.019 0.804 439 0.769 0.154     
180 4.006 0.801 440 0.756 0.151     
181 3.994 0.799 441 0.744 0.149     
           
199 3.763 0.753 459 0.519 0.104     
200 3.750 0.750 460 0.506 0.101     
201 3.738 0.748 461 0.494 0.099     
           
219 3.519 0.7038 479 0.269 0.054     
220 3.506 0.7012 480 0.256 0.051     
221 3.494 0.6988 481 0.244 0.049     
           
239 3.269 0.6538 499 0.013 0.003     
240 3.256 0.6512 500 0.000 0.000     
241 3.244 0.6488 501 -0.013 -0.003     
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 Table 8: Agent Per Token Earnings from Group Account 
Agent's 
allocation 
decision 
to group 
account 
Tokens 
allocated to 
the group 
account 
Group's 
additional     
return 
Individual's 
additional 
return (20% 
of group's 
return) 
    
- 1 6.238 1.248 
1 5 6.194 1.239 
2 10 6.131 1.226 
4 20 6.006 1.201 
8 40 5.756 1.151 
12 60 5.506 1.101 
16 80 5.256 1.051 
20 100 5.000 1.000 
24 120 4.756 0.951 
28 140 4.506 0.901 
32 160 4.256 0.851 
36 180 4.006 0.801 
40 200 3.750 0.750 
44 220 3.506 0.701 
48 240 3.256 0.651 
52 260 3.006 0.601 
56 280 2.756 0.551 
60 300 2.500 0.500 
64 320 2.256 0.451 
68 340 2.006 0.401 
72 360 1.756 0.351 
76 380 1.506 0.301 
80 400 1.250 0.250 
84 420 1.000 0.200 
88 440 0.756 0.151 
92 460 0.506 0.101 
96 480 0.256 0.051 
100 500 0.000 0.000 
104 520 -0.244 -0.049 
108 540 -0.494 -0.099 
112 560 -0.744 -0.149 
116 580 -0.994 -0.199 
120 600 -1.244 -0.249 
124 620 -1.494 -0.299 
125 625 -1.556 -0.311 
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1.6.4 Contribution Graphs by Group, Treatment, and Round 
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Figure 7: Boundary No-Agent First Contributions by Round 
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Figure 8: Boundary Agent First Contributions by Round 
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Figure 9: Interior No-Agent First Contributions by Round 
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Figure 10: Interior Agent First Contributions by Round 
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2.0  WEALTH, HETEROGENEITY, EQUITY, AND PUBLIC GOOD PROVISION 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
2.1.1 Overview 
In the ongoing discussion over how to most efficiently provide for public goods, the question of 
fairness and who in society should bear the cost still is debated. When public goods are privately 
provided, no mechanism exists to ensure fairness of giving based on the level of wealth of the 
individual contributors.  On the other hand, categorizing giving levels by wealth is possible in 
public provision of public goods.  Thus, a query of equity through the public good develops.  Is it 
possible to achieve equality in wealth through public provision of a public good when there 
exists group inequality in endowment levels and opportunities for discrimination?  The following 
paper and experiment address this very question in an attempt to discover if equity is possible in 
public giving through group agents when predatory action is possible. 
The issue of the efficiency of public provision versus private provision is addressed in a 
previous experiment on agent-giving to public goods (Wick 2008).  In this paper, private giving 
is contrasted with giving under an agent treatment where agents make a single allocation 
decision for all members of their group. A voting treatment is also included to see which of these 
mechanisms, using a group agent or giving to the public good as individuals, is more popular.  In 
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this experiment all subjects had the same wealth; therefore, it is not clear how a player's wealth 
within the group may affect a subject's giving behavior both privately and as an agent.  In 
addition, since agents are making a single contribution decision for all group members similar to 
a single lump-sum tax, they do not have the ability to discriminate giving levels among members 
of the group.  Giving through these agents most frequently brings about Pareto-efficient 
provision of the public good.  Therefore, the experiment in this paper provides a robustness 
check if the efficiency seen in agent rounds when wealth is equalized can be achieved with 
heterogeneity in the group. 
The current experiment features a wealth distribution among the players of each group.  
This wealth inequality creates the basis on which the agent can choose different allocations for 
the separate wealth factions among their overall group.  Therefore, the varied wealth levels will 
allow for the agent to differentiate contribution levels for each wealth group, permitting the agent 
to single themselves out of their contribution decisions.  This bias in giving by the agent could be 
achieved by other means than creating wealth distinctions, but this design highlights questions of 
discrimination, predation, and equity. The similarity in all other design factors will allow the 
results to be compared across experiments. 
 With these changes in wealth and opportunities for discrimination among the group, new 
questions can be answered. They include: will agents be predatory in their allocation behavior by 
deciding their wealth group will not contribute to the public good?  Or do agents consider issues 
of fairness and equity when making allocation decisions?  Can efficiency be achieved in this 
environment with group heterogeneity?  Also, due to their higher endowment, do the wealthy in 
the group privately provide more for the public good than the poor?  In addition with the voting 
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treatment, players will be able to voice their preference for the agent or no-agent treatment, and 
we can uncover if their vote is correlated with their wealth. 
2.1.2 Literature Review 
For an overall survey of public good experiments, see Ledyard (1995). 
According to Samuelson (1954, 1955), using decentralized giving to a public good does 
not create an environment where an optimal social solution can be reached.  In a private 
provision setting, "any one person can hope to snatch some selfish benefit in a way not possible 
under the self-policing competitive pricing of private goods" (Samuelson 1954).  Thus, allowing 
for public provision through an agent can help to alleviate group coordination and cooperation 
problems seen in individual contribution experiments (Wick 2008).  However, adding inequality 
among group members, such as varying levels of wealth, can create problems for cooperation.  
Heterogeneity among group members creates "psychological effects," reducing the tendency to 
cooperate and creating feelings of unfairness (Putnam 2000).  Inequality weakens group 
cohesiveness, generating a decline in collective effectiveness and diminishing other regarding 
preferences (Kaplan et al. 1996, Wilkinson 1996, Knack and Keefer 1997, Kawachi et. al 1997, 
Putnum 2000). 
For a review of social science literature on the costs of inequality, see Thorbecke and 
Charumilind (2002). 
The dampening result of inequality on public good provision can be shown through 
empirical studies on factors influencing collective allocation.  Alesina, Baqir, and Easterly 
(1999) find a significant association between degrees of heterogeneity (such as race or gender) 
and expenditures on public goods.  Lindert (1996) and Moene and Wallerstein (2002) show that 
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inequality across countries is correlated with lower public spending.  In a study on contributions 
to local charities, Hochand and Rodgers (1973) show that giving is highly sensitive to the 
distribution of income in a community.  Other studies that show group heterogeneity is 
negatively associated with the efficacy of collective action (Alesina and La Ferrara 2000, 
Cardenas 2003, Costa and Kahn 2003a, 2003b). 
Looking through the literature on public good experiments where groups face some 
inequality among members, most often overall contributions to the group account are diminished 
in the presence of heterogeneity.   Anderson, Mellor, and Milyo (2004) find that presence of 
inequality in subject-fixed payments reduces contributions regardless of relative position in the 
group.  In situations where endowment inequality is present in the group, Buckley and Croson 
(2003) discover lower provision levels of the public good.  In threshold public good games, both 
Bagnoli and McKee (1991) and Rapoport and Suleiman (1993) present results of reductions in 
contributions to the group account when endowments vary within the group. 
As seen above, inequality or heterogeneity in group formation can often create problems 
for coordination in giving to a public good.  But what are some causes for this difference in 
allocation behavior? In theory, the total supply of the public good is independent of the 
distribution of income or level of wealth inequality in a group (Warr, 1983; Bergstrom et al., 
1986). In behavioral studies, Fehr and Schmidt (1999) discover that experimental subjects face 
asymmetric inequality aversion which may be the cause for lower contributions from the poor in 
private giving with varied wealth levels.  Due to the decrease in giving from the poor, all else 
equal, the level of the public good is lower.  Differences in wealth in a group can determine not 
only the extent of gains to be earned through the public good, but wealth can also have status 
value (Berger et al, 1972).  Ball et al. (2001) finds that inequality in status affected the 
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distribution of the group surplus with higher shares being received by those with higher status.  
In addition, Konrad (1994) finds that individuals have distortionary incentive to reduce their 
disposable income so as to shift the burden of provision to others.  Thus, the wealthy in a group 
are more likely to spend their endowments on consummatory purchases in order have an excuse 
to not provide for the public good. 
 Subjects in environments where heterogeneity is present are shown to be concerned 
about issues of fairness.  Research in psychology suggests that from childhood people can 
distinguish between outcomes of fairness and outcomes that serve their own interests (Messick 
and Sentis, 1983; Marwell and Ames , 1981; Wit, Wilke and Oppewal, 1992).  Thus, in 
outcomes of fairness which support proportional contribution, the wealthy in a group are 
expected to contribute more in order to redistribute wealth through the public good (van Dijk and 
Wilke, 1994).  In investigating choices over types of public good provision, Meltzer and Richard 
(1981 and 1983) show that, all else constant, an increase in inequality makes subjects more 
inclined to choose public expenditures with a redistributive effect. Using voting to choose 
allocation mechanisms, Clark (1998) investigates issues of fairness and proportionality and finds 
that, in over half the observations, subjects choose mechanisms that serve their own self-interest.  
Thus, the wealthy are more likely to choose allocation mechanisms that follow an equal giving 
rule to maximize their profits, and the poor are more likely to favor mechanisms focused on 
fairness such as proportional giving. 
On one hand, the literature on group inequality in theory and in experiments suggests that 
heterogeneity in wealth among group members should generate questions of fairness and 
inequality aversion in private contributions to the group account.  On the other hand, in 
investigating the theory of the agent's allocation dilemma, predatory allocation decisions based 
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on wealth are observed frequently, diminishing the redistributive possibilities through the public 
good.  Therefore, the question becomes: can experimental subjects overcome problems created 
by wealth heterogeneity in their group and exploit the benefit of an agent in providing for the 
public good or will predatory behavior frustrate the coordination role of agents. 
2.2 EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN 
2.2.1 Basic Design 
The basic concept for this experiment is an extension of the previous work on agents in public 
good games allowing agents to make contribution decisions to a group account given that group 
members face a distribution of wealth.  Thus, the design of the experiment is kept as close as 
possible to the original in order to compare results in contribution behavior, discrimination, and 
changes in wealth between experiments. 
The experiment follows a 2x3x2 design for a public good experiment.  Each design 
consists of 60 decision rounds, 20 rounds of no-agent decisions, 20 rounds of agent decisions, 
and 20 rounds of voting decisions.9  These three environments are examined in both interior and 
boundary solutions designs.  In addition, two wealth designs are implemented: one where the 
group had a majority of "wealthy" members and one where the group had a majority of "poor" 
members.  In the design where the wealthy have the majority, the group has three high 
                                                 
9 The ordering between the first two treatments was reversed to check for ordering effects but the voting 
treatment remained as the last 20 rounds so subjects could decide which mechanism they would rather have after 
having experienced both the agent and no-agent treatments. 
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endowment members and two low endowment members.  It is referred to as the Rich design.  In 
the design where the poor dominate, the group has two high endowment members and three low 
endowment members.  It is referred to as the Poor design.  Please see Table 9 for a layout of 
treatments during the experimental sessions. 
In all treatments, the group composition does not change across rounds, meaning the 
same group of n = 5 subjects play a finitely-repeated public good game for the course of a 60-
round experimental session.  Due to the slight complexity of the mathematics and search 
associated with the mechanics of the interior solution, the fixed pairings allow for increased 
cooperation and fewer distractions in strategy formation during the decision process.10
The interior design consisted of 12 groups of 5 subjects for a total of 60 subjects, and the 
boundary design consisted of 8 groups of 5 subjects play their within-subject design for a total of 
40 subjects.  Each of the sessions listed in Table 9 was conducted once. 
                                                 
10 Even though these fixed pairings allow for repeated game strategies to emerge among group members, I 
do not believe behavior would be any different with random matching given the research done by Andreoni and 
Croson (2001).  In addition, in looking at the results, it appears that the treatment variables and learning are driving 
the differences in giving behavior. 
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Table 9: Session Treatment Design 
Session Name* # Low Endow 
# High 
Endow Rounds 1-20 Rounds 21-40 Rounds 41-60 
BoundaryRichNA No Agent Agent Voting 
BoundaryRichAN 2 3 Agent No Agent Voting 
BoundaryPoorNA No Agent Agent Voting 
BoundaryPoorAN 3 2 Agent No Agent Voting 
InteriorRichNA No Agent Agent Voting 
InteriorRichAN 2 3 Agent No Agent Voting 
InteriorPoorNA No Agent Agent Voting 
InteriorPoorAN 3 2 Agent No Agent Voting 
*Each interior session consisted of 3 groups of 5 subjects.  Each boundary session consisted of 2 groups of 5 
subjects. 
 
At the beginning of each round, each group member is gifted with a number of tokens as 
his or her endowment. These tokens can be invested between two accounts: the group account 
and a subject's own private account. Each member of the group has a different amount of tokens 
gifted to them at the beginning of every period depending on their type, but overall group wealth 
is constant at 625 tokens.  Low-endowed members in each group are given the title type 1, and 
high-endowed members are type 2.  In the Rich wealth design, two type-1 group members have 
an endowment of 50 tokens, and three type-2 group members have an endowment of 175 tokens.  
In the Poor wealth design, three type-1 group members have an endowment of 75 tokens, and 
two type-2 group members have an endowment of 200 tokens. Both groups begin each round 
with wealth inequality given by a Gini coefficient of 0.24.11  Tokens cannot be carried between 
rounds.   
                                                 
11 A Gini coefficient measures inequality within a wealth distribution.  It is a ratio between zero and one; 
the closer the coefficient is to zero the greater the wealth equity among the group. 
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When the round starts, each individual is asked how many tokens they would like to 
allocate to the group account.  Tokens not contributed to the group account remain in a subject's 
private account. Thus, in the no-agent treatment, the group account consists of the sum of the 
tokens contributed by all five members.  The difference in the agent treatment is each individual 
is asked to make an allocation decision for the group by deciding how many tokens both type-1 
and type-2 members must contribute to the group account.  The agent's allocation decision is 
mimics the tax bracket structure the US government imposes on wealth groups, where the 
specific amount of the tax depends on the individual's wealth level.  Therefore in each round in 
the agent treatment, each group member makes decisions about how many of each type of group 
member's tokens will be contributed to the group account.  Since the agent is included in one 
wealth group, their profit is affected by their allocation decision, which creates the differential-
giving conundrum.  In order to increase the agent's own profit, he or she should increase token 
allocations to the group account from the other wealth group and decrease allocations from their 
own wealth group.   
    After all subjects have made agent decisions, one group member is chosen at random 
to be the agent whose decision is then implemented for the group.  The total number of tokens in 
the group account in the agent treatment is then decided from the random agent decision and the 
number of each type of group member in the treatment. 
    In the last 20 rounds, subjects vote on whether they would like to have an agent make a 
group allocation decision or utilize the individual, no-agent mechanism.  The decision is imposed 
by majority rule.  Therefore, the allocation mechanism becomes endogenous to the group.  Even 
though agency should lead to more efficient outcomes increasing overall group wealth, agency 
would not be effective as an allocation method if it was not preferred above private giving.  
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Group members can voice their opinion about what method of giving they prefer.  If three or 
more group members vote for one outcome, it is imposed.  The numerical outcome of the vote is 
not revealed to participants so as not to influence giving behavior.  The outcome is only revealed 
by allocation method which is implemented. 
    Participants were volunteers recruited from the University of Pittsburgh Experimental 
Economics Laboratory mailing list which include students and adults from the Pittsburgh area. 
All experimental sessions were conducted at the University of Pittsburgh Experimental 
Economics Laboratory. 
2.2.2 Payoff Design 
2.2.2.1 Boundary Solution 
The no-agent treatment in the boundary condition leads to the typical, zero-contribution 
Nash equilibrium for both types of players, but theory suggests that behavior under agent 
decision making will be much different.  In the previous experiment when each member of the 
group has equal wealth, the agent's single-allocation problem for the group leads to full 
contribution and Pareto optimality for all marginal per capita return rates (MPCR) less than 1 
and greater than 0.2.  The agent's problem changes with the addition of a wealth distribution and 
the ability to differentiate between two wealth groups.  In this experiment, agents decide how 
much type-1 and type-2 players must allocate to the group account.  To investigate this problem 
further, let's look at a type 1 agent's profit-maximization problem. 
At the beginning of each period, each of the  type-1 subjects is endowed with  
tokens and each of the  type-2 subjects is endowed with  tokens (where 
1n 1y
2n 2y 521 =+ nn  and 
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6252211 =+ ynyn ).  In each period, the representative decides to allocate  of each type-1's 
endowment to the public good and of each type-2's endowment.  These allocations,  and , 
are uniform across all subjects in their respective types; the agent's own endowment and profit 
are included in the decision he/she imposes for their own type.  Therefore in each period, each 
type-1 subject acting as an agent must maximize his or her profits given by: 
1t
2t 1t 2t
(1) )( 2211111 tntnaty ++−=π , where a is the marginal per capita return from a 
contribution to the public good; )(10 211 nnaana +<<<< . 
In the previous experiment, since all group members were identical, the dominant 
strategy for any agent was to allocate all of each group member's tokens to the group account 
since they could not single themselves out of the group.  By dividing the group into two wealth 
groups, each agent can now differentiate between their own wealth group and the other.  
Evidence of favoritism to their own wealth group can be seen in the solution to the maximization 
problem in (1).  Even though the most-efficient, Pareto-optimal group outcome is for the agent to 
set and , individual optimality in (1) allows for agents to isolate their own group 
and seek predatory action upon the opposite wealth group. 
11 yt = 22 yt =
Because an agent can favor their own wealth group in their allocation designs, they will 
choose zero contribution for their group.  Therefore, in order to maximize their profits from the 
group account, optimally the agent make allocations such that the opposite wealth group will 
bear the entire burden of the public good.  A type-1 agent will set their own allocation  for the 1t
 54 
public good such that  since 01 =t 01
1
1 <+−= an
dt
dπ .12  In addition, a type-1 agent will set 
equal to its maximum for the type-2 member of its group since 2t 02
2
1 >= an
dt
dπ .  A very similar 
profit maximization problem can be performed for type 2 agents to find that they would 
strategically choose and  equal to its upper boundary.  Thus, the total number of tokens 
in the group account is either  or  depending on which type of player is randomly chosen 
as the group agent.  Either value,  or , are smaller than the total number of tokens 
allocated in the dominant strategy in the homogeneous wealth case. 
02 =t 1t
11yt 22 yt
11yt 22 yt
Thus, the payoff functions from an agent's decision for each type-1 player and each type-
2 player are: 
 )(7.0)(2.2 2211111 ntntte ++−=π , 
 )(7.0)(2.2 2211222 ntntte ++−=π .13
    This set of optimal strategies does not make for wealth-equalizing behavior on the part 
of rich members of a group.  By acting in this predatory manner, type-2 agents, "the wealthy," 
will be taxing all of the poor's endowment to the public good and keeping all of their own 
endowment in their private accounts.  These allocations will serve to widen further the gap 
between the rich and the poor.  Therefore, when this favoritism is possible, it is especially 
                                                 
12 Recall  depending on the wealth treatment and a, the MPCR, is 0.318.  This MPCR is derived 
from a ratio of payoffs at the Nash equilibrium and Pareto optimal outcomes in the LWW paper and was used in the 
previous experimental paper.  Therefore, keeping a = 0.318 will allow for comparisons between giving in this 
experiment and the previous one. 
3,21 =n
13 Recall that in the Rich and Poor wealth designs respectively. (75,200)(50,175),),( 21 =ee
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interesting to investigate the question of equity in wealth while making agent decisions. If agents 
are giving according to the group Pareto optimum, each subject's profits would be equal, and 
there will longer exist a disparity between the wealthy and the poor.  So this design begs the 
question: do all agents, poor and rich alike, act selfishly, keeping their own tokens and taxing 
their neighbors?  Or do some look out for the well-being of the group as a whole? 
    In the last 20 rounds of each session, voting on a preferred mechanism of giving is 
conducted to see which is more favorable to the majority of group members.  Private giving in 
no-agent rounds may frustrate players who would like to coordinate on higher group giving, but 
the advantages of agency may be limited if subjects follow predatory allocation strategies.  
Different wealth groups might prefer different mechanisms of giving, and thus these varied 
giving structures should arise from the majority wealth group, either the wealth or the poor, in 
the two wealth designs.   
    To investigate if subjects will opt for varied allocation mechanisms in voting rounds, 
we can examine their payoffs by type to find their preference.  If we assume that in no-agent 
rounds, subjects follow the Nash-equilibrium strategy of zero contribution, and in agent rounds, 
subjects follow a predatory allocation strategy, then we can investigate extensive-form game 
trees of payoffs from different voting decisions as seen in Figure 11.  At the end of each node are 
type-1 and type-2 players’ payoffs in expectation from following this set of strategies. 
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 Figure 11: Extensive Form Game Trees of Type 1 and Type 2 Players’ Voting Decisions in 
Boundary Wealth Designs 
Agents can help to increase giving amounts to a public good, but in the case involving the 
ability to discriminate by wealth, agency does not always increase payoffs for each type of 
player.  Given the probabilities that types will randomly be chosen as an agent, type-2 players in 
the Poor design strictly prefer the no-agent treatment to the agent treatment.  All other types in 
the boundary wealth designs strictly prefer the agent treatment.  Given that these wealthy players 
do not have the majority in the Poor design, agency should still arise as the giving mechanism of 
choice in this wealth design as well as the Rich design. 
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2.2.2.2 Interior Solution 
Recall that the mechanics of the interior solution are derived from the Laury, Walker, and 
Williams (1999) paper utilizing the details of their Z125-DET treatment.  The set up for the 
return to the group account for a subject denoted by the function F(.), the group size, the 
endowments for each member, as well as parts of the instructions and tables given to the subjects 
were all employed from their interior design. 
This design adheres to the structure of voluntary contribution mechanism where subjects 
decide how to allocate their endowment between their private and the group account.  At the 
beginning of each period, each of 5 subjects in a group is endowed with different private 
amounts.  Each individual i decides how many of their tokens to allocate to the group account, 
.  Thus, the total number of tokens in the group account is  where 1g ,
4
1
∑
=
+
j
ji gg .ij ≠  
The return the group account for a subject is given by F(.) which is a non-linear function 
with a declining benefit from the group account.  Each subject receives 
n
1  or 
5
1  of total group 
account earnings.  Therefore, each subjects receives 
F g gi j( )+ j∑
5
in points as their individual 
return from the group account.  Each token remaining in their private account earns a subject one 
point. 
If we name the number of tokens in the group account X, then total group earnings from 
the group account is; ; . Thus, the marginal social benefit from the 
group account is;  and the marginal per capita return (MPCR) is; 
200625.025.6)( XXXF −=
XXF 0125.025.6)(' −=
.0025.025.1)(' X
N
XF −=  
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Using the same variables as before in the boundary analysis, if an agent chooses an 
allocation of for type 1 group members and for type 2 group members, then the payoff 
functions for each type 1 player i and each type 2 player j are; 
1t 2t
 
.
5
)()(
,
5
)()(
2211
22
2211
22
2211
11
2211
11
tntnFte
N
tntnFte
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N
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j
i
++−=++−=
++−=++−=
π
π
14
Figure 1 shows a graphic representation of separate individual and group benefits and 
costs of placing a token in the group account.  The marginal cost of allocating one token to the 
group account is the one point that could have been earned from placing the token in the private 
account.  That token could also be placed in the group account which would yields returns not 
only for the individual player in the form of their marginal private benefit but also to the group in 
the form of the marginal social benefit.   
Thus, setting the marginal cost equal to marginal private benefit yields a Nash 
equilibrium provision for the group of 100 tokens.  Similarly, setting marginal cost equal to 
marginal social benefit generates a group Pareto optimum provision of 420 tokens.  It is 
important to note that these solutions are in aggregate contributions.  Therefore, there exist a 
continuum of individual best responses to behavior on the part of their group members’ decisions 
to reach these contributions. 
Even though the distribution of wealth has changed dramatically since the last 
experiment, the overall group wealth is the same and thus the aggregate Nash equilibrium is 100 
tokens and the Pareto optimum is 420 tokens.  Any combination of token allocations that 
achieves 100 tokens is dubbed a Nash equilibrium in this environment. However, any outcome 
                                                 
14 Recall that in the Rich and Poor wealth designs respectively. (75,200)(50,175),),( 21 =ee
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without an agent will almost certainly favor the wealthy.  Those with higher endowments in no-
agent treatments are likely to hold onto the majority of their endowment in their private account 
and yield the same benefit from the group account as those with lower endowments.  Similarly, if 
agents are making Pareto-optimal decisions, the group account has 420 tokens at the end of the 
round.  It does not matter from whose account these tokens come.  Thus, just as in the boundary 
solution, there is an incentive for agents to favor their wealth group and "tax" the wealth of the 
other toward the public good.  Consequently, they will make the other wealth contingent 
contribute all or almost all of their tokens to the group account and keep all of their own to 
increase their earnings. 
The interior, Nash-equilibrium environment is mathematically more complex than the 
boundary solution.  Subjects no longer face a Nash equilibrium that is unique on the individual 
level or involves a dominant strategy.  Thus, there exists a coordination issue involved in 
reaching the unique aggregate Nash equilibrium since there are many individual Nash outcomes.  
Additionally, the complex MPCR in the non-linear case makes the calculation of the solutions 
more difficult than in the boundary condition. Therefore, participants are given detailed 
information on the payoff structure of the experiment in the form of payoff tables in order to 
compare group and individual returns to specific contributions to the group account (see 1.6.3 
Appendix C in previous chapter).  These are provided in addition to the written instructions and 
were given to each participant.  The tables are reviewed by the experimenter along with the 
instructions before the beginning of the experiment.  Included in these tables is information on 
the additional return to the group and the additional return to the individual for contribution to 
the group account as well as examples of earnings from the group account. 
 60 
Subjects are given questionnaires at the beginning every treatment to test their 
understanding of the instructions and the environment.  Participants demonstrate high levels of 
understanding of the interior Nash environment.  In addition, the questions and their answers are 
carefully reviewed with the subjects to further ensure understanding. 
2.2.2.3 Payment 
At the end of the experiment, participants are paid in private for their earnings in one randomly 
chosen period.  Paying participants for one period rather than all of their decisions is chosen in 
order to avoid wealth effects throughout the experiment.  Points are converted to dollars in the 
following fashion.  In the interior-solution design, 1 point = 0.05 dollars and in the boundary-
solution design 1 point = 0.03 dollars.   The difference in payment comes from the increased 
difficulty of the interior-solution case and consequently its longer sessions.  Boundary-solution 
sessions often lasts between an hour to an hour and a half, and interior-solution sessions lasts 
approximately just under two hours.  One interior-solution session had to be cut short because it 
exceeded the two hours for which participants were recruited.  All participants also earn a five 
dollar participation bonus.  Thus, average earnings are around $13-15 in the boundary-solution 
sessions and $19-21 in the interior-solution sessions. 
2.3 PREDICTIONS 
Group members acting as agents are likely to place the entire burden of the public good on the 
wealth group in which they do not belong and "free-ride" off their contributions in both solution 
designs.  The ability to distinguish between wealth types allows this predatory behavior to take 
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place.  One of the reasons for designing the experiment such that agents have ability to 
discriminate based on wealth levels is to discover which type of agent will approach taxing each 
wealth group in the most equitable way.   
The ability to discriminate among wealth types will affect outcomes in the agent 
treatment, but we predict that the net effects of agency will be positive. 
Hypothesis 1: Social welfare will increase with the use of an agent. 
In Wick (2008), social welfare increased with the use of an agent due to the agent's 
ability to coordinate group giving to take advantage of the increasing gains from the group 
account.  Although in this experiment agents will be making two allocation decisions with the 
ability to single themselves out through their wealth group, their group allocation decisions are 
likely to be higher than the sum of individual allocations in the no-agent treatment.  This increase 
in allocations in the agent treatment is a result of not having to coordinate on giving with other 
group members as in the no-agent treatment.  Even if agents follow a predatory allocation 
strategy, the balance in the group account will almost always be higher in the agent treatment. 
Hypothesis 2:  Because of the disparity of wealth among the group, the level of provision 
for the public good in the no-agent treatment will be lower than in the previous 
experiment with equalized endowments. 
Although group members most likely will give positive token amounts to the public good 
in the no-agent treatment (especially in the interior solution case), the varying levels of wealth 
will cause group members to be less generous in their token allocations.  The poor will look to 
the wealthy to contribute more to the group account because of their high endowments, and the 
wealthy will likely be tight-fisted due to a reluctance to let go of their wealth. 
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Hypothesis 3:  In the no-agent treatment, the poor are as likely to provide for the public 
good as the wealthy. 
Rapoport (1988) studied public good provision and the effect of asymmetry in 
endowments in an experimental setting.  He found no effect of endowments on choice behavior 
in private contributions to the group account.  He claims the reason this result was that low-
endowed subjects are more inclined to contribute to public good because they have the most to 
gain from its provision.  The rich, who have high endowments, can make high profits by keeping 
all their tokens in their private account, and thus when free-riding is present, these well-endowed 
subjects do not have as much to gain in profits from the group account. 
Even though in equilibrium giving should only be taking place for the no-agent treatment 
in the interior solution condition, positive contributions will be made in the boundary conditions.  
Players may seek to extract some of the gains from group giving to the public good, and 
therefore they contribute positive amounts above the Nash equilibrium solution hoping other 
group members will play likewise. Thus, this positive contribution behavior is likely to continue 
in the boundary case without dependence on wealth.   
In addition, given the design of the interior solution, if all subjects gave 20 tokens to the 
group account, the Nash equilibrium would be achieved.  Since this 20 token allocation is 
possible for type 1s (the poor) to give in both wealth designs, both types of subjects are likely to 
contribute equally to the public good in the interior solution case.  In addition, given the likely 
entitled attitude of the wealthy players from their high endowments, they may want to maintain a 
firm hold on their endowment from the beginning of each round.  Thus, they might contribute 
only what is necessary to the public good to achieve a Nash equilibrium, not keeping in mind 
that they bear the majority of the wealth amongst the group. 
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Hypothesis 4:  The Pareto-optimal outcome in the boundary condition of full contribution 
to the public good will not be attained due to agent predatory behavior. 
Full contribution by every group member, no matter their type, is the Pareto-optimal 
outcome (PO) in the boundary solution setup.  Given the solution to the agent's problem as seen 
above, attaining that PO will be very difficult since its choice by the agent is dominated by free-
riding off the opposite wealth group's tokens, increasing the agent's profit.  Thus, since the PO is 
no longer the dominant choice for the agent, tokens in the group account will fall below the PO 
in boundary agent rounds. 
Hypothesis 5: By the end of agent decision rounds, both types of players will display 
predatory behavior, meaning the wealthy will place all of the poor group's endowment in 
the group account and none of their own, and the poor will do the same to the wealthy. 
As we saw before, an agent's dominant strategy is to keep all their own to tokens in their 
own private account in the boundary condition.  In addition, an agent following a dominant 
strategy would place all of the opposite wealth group's tokens into the group account.  Therefore, 
agents in the interior design should act in a similar manner, placing all of the opposite wealth 
group's tokens into the group account up to the Pareto-optimal amount.   
Hypothesis 6: Poor subjects will make more wealth-equalizing decisions as agents of the 
group. 
Given their lower endowment at the start of each round, I predict that poorer group 
members will be more likely to make agent decisions that will equalize group wealth at the end 
of each round.  As agents, the poor can only serve to better their situation over private giving 
where they are likely to collect small profits.  However, this conclusion can be a little misleading 
since if the poor and the wealthy both follow a predatory allocation strategy, the allocations 
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made by the poor will automatically appear more equitable.  When the wealthy take predatory 
actions as agents upon the poor, the outcome only makes the existing wealth gap between the 
rich and the poor even wider. 
Because of their low endowment, poor players can benefit greatly from agent rounds 
since the majority of their profits in any treatment are likely to come through the group account.  
Due to repeated game effects, low-endowed players should show less frequent predatory 
allocation action than their wealthy counterparts in an effort to prevent estranging themselves 
from the wealthy.  Groups are matched for all 60 rounds of a session, and therefore players must 
think about how their allocation behavior might affect another group member's allocation 
behavior in future rounds. 
2.4 RESULTS 
Observation 1: In both the interior- and boundary- solution conditions, token allocations are 
lower in the no-agent treatments than when wealth was equalized among the group, confirming 
hypothesis 2. 
This observation can be verified by comparing the contribution behavior across the 
experiments.  This data is presented in Table 10.  This table shows that every group account 
average under "SameW" is higher than under either of the two wealth designs in both the interior 
and boundary set up.15  The only group allocation that is close to its same wealth levels is the 
                                                 
15 This is an abbreviation "SameW" applies to results from my previous experiment (Wick 2008) where 
individuals faced a uniform wealth distribution in their group. 
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Boundary Poor wealth case where the difference in group account tokens with the SameW no-
agent rounds is less than 25.  Using paired, Wilcoxon sign-rank tests of average no-agent 
contributions by round, in all designs no-agent contributions with a wealth distribution do not 
come from the same distribution as those with equal wealth at the 2% level.16  In addition, in 
both interior and boundary conditions, rich and poor wealth design no-agent contribution follow 
different distributions even at the 1% level. 
Table 10: Comparing Provision of the Public Good in No-Agent Treatment under Wealth and 
Solution Conditions 
 # of Obs Ave NA Cont Ave Group Tokens 
INTERIOR    
SameW 600 49.5 247.5 
Rich Design 600 37.8 188.8 
Poor Design 600 29.4 147.1 
    
BOUNDARY    
SameW 600 26.2 131 
Rich Design 400 6.9 34.4 
Poor Design 400 21.6 107.8 
 
 Adding a wealth distribution to the original experiment changed private giving behavior, 
specifically subjects are less inclined to give to the public good.  The varying wealth levels 
created an inherent difference between the group players increased free-riding behavior in the 
group.   
This observation diverges from theories developed by Bergstrom, Blume, and Varian 
(1986), who make predictions involving the level of the public good under private giving with a 
                                                 
16 This non-parametric test checks the equality of matched pairs of observations using the Wilcoxon 
matched-pairs signed-ranks test. The null hypothesis is that both distributions are the same. 
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redistribution of wealth.  In theorem 4 of their paper, they state that "In a Nash equilibrium, any 
change in the wealth distribution that leaves unchanged the aggregate wealth of current 
contributors will either increase or leave unchanged the equilibrium supply of the public good."  
The level of aggregate wealth (625 group tokens) is constant throughout both experiments.  The 
group of non-contributors in all wealth and solution designs is quite small; most players 
contribute positive amounts to the public good.  With the wealth redistribution in these 
experiments, the supply of the public good did not increase or stay the same, but rather it 
decreased. 
Observation 2: Overall group surplus increases in the agent treatment over the no-agent 
treatment, thus confirming hypothesis 1. 
Table 11: Average Group Profits by Treatment 
Treatment No Agent Agent Voting 
BoundaryRich 1419.7 1693.3 1685.7 
BoundaryPoor 1515.1 1875.5 1731.7 
InteriorRich 1352.2 1515.2 1552.3 
InteriorPoor 1234.8 1572.0 1661.0 
 
Table 11 shows average group profits by treatment in all solution and wealth designs.  In 
every instance, agent group profits are higher than no-agent group profits indicating greater 
overall surplus in the agent treatment.  Using paired, one-sided, Wilcoxon sign-rank tests of 
average subject profits by treatment in each design, agent profits are higher than no-agent profits 
in every design at the 1% level.  Average group profits are higher in the interior voting rounds 
but not in the boundary voting rounds.  Using the same paired, sign-rank of average subject 
profits by treatment in each design, voting profits are only statistically higher than agent profits 
in the interior-poor design at the 5% level. 
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The addition of the wealth distribution does not affect the overall increased social benefit 
of the agent treatment over the no-agent treatment, but the wealth disparities among the group 
decrease social welfare in both solution conditions and in all treatments, as predicted.  Average 
group profits are higher when wealth is equalized in the previous experiment. 
Observation 3:  In private provision, in most cases the poor provide close to 50% of the 
group public good, confirming hypothesis 3. 
Table 12 helps to illustrate this observation by displaying subjects' giving statistics by 
wealth group in percentages of their endowment and of the wealth group's percentage of 
providing for the tokens in the group account.  In any "No Agent" row, one can find what 
percentage of their endowment both low- and high-endowed subjects give to the group account, 
and how much their wealth groups' tokens account for the overall total of the group account's 
tokens.17 In a Low Agent row, one can observe on average how type-1 players form their 
allocation structures as agents.  This is accomplished by looking across the row at what 
percentage of their own type's endowment they allocate to the group account (Low%Endow) and 
what percentage of the opposite type's endowment do they allocate to the group account 
(High%Endow).  Then in the last two columns, the percentages of provision by wealth group 
from the low agent decisions are displayed.  The same analysis of a high agent behavior can be 
made in a High Agent row. 
                                                 
17 Therefore, one can see by what percentage a low- or high-endowed wealth group provided for the public 
good. 
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Table 12: Giving Statistics as Percentage of Wealth 
Interior Poor Design:*    
 Low%Endow High%Endow LowGroup% of GA*** HighGroup% of GA 
NA Stats: 0.368 0.161 0.596 0.404 
Low Agents: 0.311 0.762 0.330 0.810 
High Agents: 0.753 0.287 0.620 0.380 
     
Interior Rich Design:**    
 Low%Endow High%Endow LowGroup% of GA HighGroup% of GA 
NA Stats: 0.391 0.286 0.232 0.768 
Low Agents: 0.147 0.807 0.040 0.960 
High Agents: 0.622 0.432 0.435 0.688 
     
Boundary Poor Design:*    
 Low%Endow High%Endow LowGroup% of GA HighGroup% of GA 
NA Stats: 0.253 0.127 0.429 0.571 
Low Agents: 0.357 0.897 0.155 0.845 
High Agents: 0.722 0.162 0.603 0.363 
     
Boundary Rich Design:**    
 Low%Endow High%Endow LowGroup% of GA HighGroup% of GA 
NA Stats: 0.157 0.036 0.419 0.456 
Low Agents: 0.210 0.769 0.071 0.917 
High Agents: 0.680 0.318 0.603 0.397 
     
* In the Poor wealth design, the wealthy have 1.78 times more wealth as the poor as a group in the TH treatment and each 
individual has 2.67 times more wealth than each poor individual.  The poor have 36% of group wealth and the wealthy have 
63%. 
**In the Rich wealth design, wealthy have 5.25 times more wealth as the poor as a group in the TL treatment and each 
individual has 3.5 times more wealth than each poor individual.  The poor have 16% of group wealth and the wealthy have 
84%. 
***These columns indicate what percentage of the group account's tokens came from the low or high endowment group. 
 
As can be seen in third column Table 12, in all cases, the poor are providing large 
percentages of the tokens in the group account during no-agent treatments.   Over all wealth and 
solution designs, the percentages of the tokens in the group account provided by the poor rival 
those of the wealthy.  The poor in the Poor wealth design have 36% of the group endowment, 
and they providing for almost half of the public good and are also giving a higher percentage of 
their endowment.  In the Rich wealth design, each one of the two poor individuals has 
7
2 ths the 
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endowment of one of three of their wealthy group counterparts, and the poor together only have 
16% of the overall group wealth.  Still even in the Rich interior case where the percentage of 
giving by the poor to the group account is the smallest, they are still giving close to one-fourth of 
the public good and a greater percentage of their endowment than the wealthy.  Thus, the poor 
are making greater sacrifices from their small endowments to give privately to the public good 
than the wealthy because they stand to gain the most from a large collective group account.   
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Figure 12: Pooled Boundary No Agent Contributions by Frequency 
From this experiment, we cannot conclude that all contributors have greater wealth than 
non-contributors in private giving.  Bergstrom, Blume, and Varian (1986), in theorem 5, state 
that with private provision of the public good, contributors have greater wealth than non-
contributors in a Nash equilibrium.  This experiment is not a true test of this theory, but it is 
interesting to note how behavior differs from predictions.  As shown in Figures 12 and 13, non-
 70 
contributors more frequently tend to be those with a low endowment, but the contribution 
decisions by both the wealthy and the poor does not seem to follow any clear distribution. 
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Figure 13: Pooled Interior No Agent Contributions by Frequency 
In private giving, on average groups gave over the Nash equilibrium amount prescribed 
by each solution in both the interior and boundary conditions. Nash equilibrium giving in the 
interior solution is 100 tokens for the group and in the boundary solution is zero tokens.  Giving 
in the no-agent rounds is above Nash levels but deteriorates as the rounds continue to approach 
the NE.  The no-agent giving behavior is exhibited in Figure 14.  This decline in giving is seen in 
the previous experiment only in the boundary no-agent rounds.  As the interior solution no-agent 
rounds progressed in the previous experiment, there was little to no change in allocation 
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behavior.  Therefore this addition of wealth has some changing effect on giving behavior in this 
more complex environment.   
Figures 14 and 15: Average Sum Tokens in the Group Account in various designs across the first and last 
five rounds of both the no-agent and agent treatments 
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    Figure 14: Average Token Sum in Group Account in No Agent Treatment 
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Figure 15: Average Token Sum in Group Account in Agent Treatment 
Observation 4: In agent giving rounds, tokens in the group account did not reach Pareto 
optimum levels in either solution condition, confirming hypothesis 4. 
In the interior solution, Pareto-optimal behavior for the group would be to have 420 
tokens in the group account and in the boundary solution, optimality would be to have all of the 
group's 625 tokens in the group account.  When wealth is equalized within the group, agents' 
allocations attain near Pareto-optimal levels in both the boundary and interior designs (Wick 
2008).  Giving in the boundary-agent rounds does not mimic what is seen in the previous 
experiment while interior-agent giving is quite similar.   Allocations in the boundary-agent 
rounds are considerably lower than when wealth is equalized. 
Allocation behavior in the first and last five agent rounds can be seen in Figure 15.  The 
change in agent allocations from the first five rounds to the last five is very small in the interior 
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design, implying that agents are making consistent allocation choices as rounds continue or are 
still searching for optimality.  Even though these agent group allocation amounts are strongly 
similar to the equalized wealth experiment, they still do not attain Pareto-efficient levels.   
In the boundary design, agent token allocations come quite short of group optimality.  
Agents are giving far less than the Pareto-optimal level of complete giving even as rounds 
continue due to the agent's incentive to use a predatory allocation structure.  Even in the 
BoundaryPoor design where agent allocations are the highest, tokens in the group account are 
under 450 tokens, well below optimality of 625 tokens.  Therefore, agents do not make Pareto-
optimal allocations in either solution design. 
Observation 5: In agency treatment rounds, most agents follow a simple predatory 
allocation structure, confirming hypothesis 5.  
An agent would be following a simple predatory allocation structure if they allocated all 
of the tokens from the each member of the opposite wealth group into the group account and did 
not allocate any tokens for their own wealth group.  Their own personal wealth group would 
keep all of their tokens in their own private account.  An example of this predatory behavior 
would be if a low-endowment agent in the Rich wealth design chooses an allocation structure 
such that all type-1 group members (low endowment) would give zero to the group account and 
type-2 group members would give all 175 of their tokens to the group account. 
By looking at the frequencies of agent contribution behavior seen in Figures 17 through 
24 (see 2.6.2 Appendix B), we can examine how both poor and wealthy agents make allocation 
decisions for both their own and the opposite wealth group in each wealth and solution condition.  
We see that if the figure is showing decisions for low-endowment subjects then there is a 
concentration of frequencies of decision by the low agents at the low end of the allocation 
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spectrum and a concentration of frequencies of decisions by high agents at the high end of the 
allocation spectrum.  This type of predatory behavior can be observed on every graph, but it is 
observed more easily on Figures 23 and 24 which show the agent contributions from the 
Boundary Rich design.   
One general consistency among the graphs is that the minority group, such as the high 
endowment subjects in the Poor wealth design, use this predatory allocation structure more 
frequently than the majority group.  By comparing allocation structures across figures 17 and 18, 
we see that high agents in the Poor design choose very high allocations for the poor and low 
allocations for themselves by heavier frequencies than their wealth counterparts.  This same 
comparison can be made in figures 21 and 22 to find that low agents seem to be more predatory 
than the high agents in the Rich wealth condition.  This comparison can be taken to the boundary 
graphs as well. 
Observation 6: As agents, the poor make more wealth-equalizing decisions than the 
wealthy due to the design of the experiment, but the poor are actually more predatory 
against the wealthy than vice versa, which does not confirm hypothesis 6. 
Even though the wealthy have multiples of the poor’s endowment both as a group and as 
individuals, when they are agents, they often follow the predatory strategy, increasing their 
profits by free-riding off the contributions of the poor.  Agent allocation behavior in giving 
percentages of each wealth groups' endowment to the group account can be seen in Table 12 
above.  With the exception of the Interior Rich design, wealthy agents make decisions for the 
poor to provide 60% or greater of the public good when they have as little as 16-36% of group 
wealth. 
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The aggregate percentages of provision of the public good under low agents presented in 
table 12 show a more in-depth picture of allocations made by types of agents toward different 
wealth groups.  Low agents are more inclined to place higher percentages of their opposing 
wealth groups' endowment into the group account than high agents.  Low agents place a very 
high percentage (above 70%) of the wealthy's endowment toward the public good and, in almost 
every session, allocate higher percentages of the opposite wealth group's endowment to the 
public good than high agents.  Low agents may be seeking a redistributive effect in wealth from 
their agent allocations to the group account.  In a threshold public good setting, van Dijk and 
Grodzka (1992) find that low-endowed group members considered it fair for high-endowed 
members to contribute more to the group account.   
Due to the design of the experiment, low-endowed agents seemingly make more 
equitable decisions in public good provision than those made by the wealthy.  When the poor 
place the entirety of the wealthy's endowment into the public good, there is a considerable 
amount of the public profit to be split among the members of the group due to the large amount 
of tokens in the group account.  Therefore, their predatory-agent actions lower group income 
inequality.  On the other hand, predatory-agent decisions from the wealthy create a greater 
income gap than at the onset of the experiment.   
As a result of the high-endowed agent decisions, as a group the wealthy become richer 
due to their predatory allocation behavior against the poor.  As shown in Table 13, the profit gap 
between the wealthy and the poor can become quite wide with a high-endowed agent especially 
in the boundary solution case.  The difference in profits between type-1 and type-2 players is 
much smaller with a low agent in charge, even though profits do not reach Pareto optimal levels.   
 
 76 
Table 13: Average Profits for Types under Different Agents 
 Low Agent High Agent 
Treatment Type 1* Type 2** Type 1 Type 2
InteriorPoor 320.8 318.8 261.4 379.6 
InteriorRich 340.6 327.2 238.4 318.8 
BoundaryPoor 414.0 354.0 255.3 496.5 
BoundaryRich 373.1 382.9 144.3 432.0 
*Type 1 players are the low endowed group members.   
**Type 2 players are the high endowed group members.   
 
With Gini coefficient analysis, inequalities of wealth and income distributions from each 
type of agent decisions can be compared, and we can see further evidence that the poor seem to 
be "more fair" agents.  Table 14 shows Gini coefficient analysis for each wealth and solution 
design for high agents, low agents and the no-agent treatment.18  By comparing high and low 
agents in each wealth and solution design, low agents make more wealth equalizing decisions in 
every instance.19  These results are significant at lower than the 1% level.20  The Gini coefficient 
results from the no-agent rounds are varied.  No-agent decisions are quite close to the starting 
Gini coefficient of 0.24 in the boundary solution design.  In the interior design, though, the Gini 
coefficient is much lower but is still higher than for the agent treatments.  The Gini coefficients 
for associated with agent-predatory action are presented in table 15.  Because of the experiment 
design, a low agent’s predatory strategy is more equalizing as shown by the lower Gini 
coefficient. 
                                                 
18 Recall at the beginning of each session, the wealth distribution amongst the players of the group is 0.24. 
19 Note:  Perfect wealth and income equality are achieved as a Gini coefficient approaches zero. 
20 using one-tailed, equal variance t-tests 
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Table 14:  Gini Coefficient Analysis 
 High Agents Low Agents No Agent 
 # of Obs Ave Gini # of Obs Ave Gini # of Obs Ave Gini
Boundary Rich 240 0.229 160 0.067 
Boundary Poor 160 0.179 240 0.063 
160 0.249 
Interior Rich 360 0.083 240 0.073 
Interior Poor 240 0.099 360 0.052 
240 0.127 
 
Table 15: Gini Coefficients for Agent Predatory Action 
 High Agent Low Agent 
 Predatory Gini Predatory Gini
Boundary Rich 0.307 0.064 
Boundary Poor 0.317 0.105 
Interior Rich 0.193 0.036 
Interior Poor 0.161 0.109 
 
On the other hand, even though low-endowed agents are making more wealth-equalizing 
agency decisions, they are making more predatory decisions toward high endowed members of 
their group.  In examining the agent decisions by percentages of endowment allocated to the 
group account by low agents versus high agents in all wealth treatments in table 12, low agents 
give a higher percentage of the high endowed members wealth to the group account than high 
agents give of low endowed members in every design.  Therefore, as agents, low-endowed 
members are taking larger portions of the wealthy's endowment than vice versa.  Thus, poor 
agents are more predatory toward the wealthy than the wealthy are to the poor. 
    The majority of decisions in the voting rounds were to elect an agent, although in most 
treatments the wealthy vote less frequently for an agent than the poor.  Even though predatory 
behavior is observed in agent rounds, the majority of votes are still cast to use agency as a 
method of giving to the public good.  Given that the incidence of an electing to use agency is 
70% at the low end with the BoundaryPoor treatment and 97% at the high end with the 
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InteriorPoor treatment, players in general must believe that the benefits of using an agent 
outweigh the costs.  As evidenced by their votes, the gains from using an agent to make a 
collective decision offset the risk of having an agent from an opposite wealth group use a 
predatory allocation scheme against your wealth group.  The increase in profits from the use of 
an agent is a simple reason why most players would vote to use this method of giving to the 
public good.   
    The comparison of profits among treatments for both type 1 and type 2 players across 
treatments can be seen in Table 16.    Only in the BoundaryPoor case do the wealthy profit 
considerably well in the no-agent treatment versus the agent treatment.  In that same design, 
therefore, type 2 players do not vote for an agent with high percentages (only 24% as seen below 
in Table 16).  Otherwise, players either do just as well or better in profits in the agent treatment 
versus the no-agent treatment, and the potential gains from the agent treatment are high therefore 
it is more likely to be voted for especially if you are a player in the majority group. What is also 
important to note from this chart is that wealth is redistributed among the group using any type 
of agent.  The Gini coefficients in agent rounds are reduced from the starting coefficient of 0.24, 
pointing to an overall improvement in equality from the use of an agent no matter their wealth 
type. 
Table 16: Comparison of Profits under Treatments by Type of Player 
 Type 1 Type 2 
 No Agent Agent No Agent Agent
InteriorPoor 199.1 295.1 319.7 345.1 
InteriorRich 212.8 276.7 307.8 322.0 
BoundaryPoor 197.0 352.6 459.5 408.9 
BoundaryRich 195.4 195.6 397.9 398.0 
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As seen in Table 17 and Figure 16, type-1 players with a low endowment are generally 
more likely to vote for an agent than type-2 players who benefit from the security of their high 
endowment.  Due to free-riding in private giving, the poor will only be profitable in the case of 
an agent who looks out for the interests of the entire group, therefore as a group they have very 
high incidences of voting for agency.  Because the wealthy have the benefit of knowing that in 
private giving they can always keep their high endowment and still be somewhat profitable, they 
are less likely to vote for agency.  The only exception is the Boundary Rich case where high 
endowed players voted for agency more than low endowed players by a slight margin.  In 
addition, type-2 players (those with high endowments) in the Boundary Poor design vote to have 
an agent with far less frequency than any other treatment group, confirming that, as a majority, 
these players are following their dominant strategy according to Figure 1. 
Table 17: Percentage of Votes of Each Type of Player Cast to Elect an Agent 
Treatment Overall % Low Endow High Endow Incidence of Agent 
InteriorPoor* 0.71 0.81 0.57 0.97 
InteriorRich 0.61 0.70 0.54 0.71 
BoundaryPoor 0.58 0.80 0.24 0.70 
BoundaryRich 0.68 0.67 0.69 0.90 
*Results from InteriorPoor with Agent rounds first had to be omitted since only 4 rounds of voting were 
completed. 
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    Figure 16: Percentage of Votes Cast to Elect an Agent by Type of Player 
Table 18: Two-Sided Wilcoxon Mann-Whitney Test P-values 
Boundary Design
NA 
Decisions*
Low Agent 
Decisions**
High Agent 
Decisions
Endowment (Pooled) 0.424 0.002 0.000 
Endowment within first 20 rounds 0.545 0.000 0.000 
Endowment Rich Design 0.175 0.006 0.001 
Endowment Poor Design 0.396 0.031 0.000 
Wealth Design 0.005 0.218 0.004 
Order Effect of Treatment 
(Pooled) 0.040 0.081 0.839 
Order Effect within Rich Design 0.544 0.472 0.384 
Order Effect within Poor Design 0.013 0.070 0.184 
    
Interior Design
NA 
Decisions Low Agent Decisions
High Agent 
Decisions
Endowment (Pooled) 0.055 0.000 0.000 
Endowment within first 20 rounds 0.663 0.004 0.001 
Endowment Rich Design 0.031 0.000 0.000 
Endowment Poor Design 0.767 0.000 0.000 
Wealth Design 0.615 0.013 0.308 
Order Effect of Treatment 
(Pooled) 0.008 0.767 0.690 
Order Effect within Rich Design 0.152 0.165 0.443 
Order Effect within Poor Design 0.036 0.340 0.141 
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*Compares no-agent decisions made by endowment type, across wealth designs, or by treatment sequence 
**Compares agent decisions made for type 1 players by their endowment, by wealth design, or by treatment sequence. 
 
Decisions made by type-1 players and type-2 players are, on the whole, different in not 
only agent treatments but also no-agent treatments as well as across wealth designs. Through 
Wilcoxon Mann-Whitney tests, average contribution decisions made by low-endowed players 
are compared to those made by high-endowed players to see if they belong to the same 
population with equivalent probability distributions.  In addition, tests are run to see if there is an 
effect of placing the no-agent treatment first or second in the series of treatments in the within-
subject design as well as if there was a difference in the decisions making between the wealth 
designs. The results of the two-sided Wilcoxon Mann-Whitney tests are shown in Table 18.  The 
Wilcoxon Mann-Whitney rank sum tests show how the decisions in the three right hand columns 
are affected by the regressor in the first column of the table. 
Table 18 shows decisions in no-agent treatment rounds are affected by variables causing 
differences in the distributions of private allocations to the group account.  For instance, in the 
interior no-agent treatments, the pooled "endowment" variable is significant at the 6% level, 
meaning that type-1 private contributions are different from type-2 contributions.  The pooled 
endowment variable is not significant in the boundary no-agent decisions, meaning that private 
contributions are not different by those with different wealth.  When the endowment variable in 
no-agent rounds is broken down into different wealth designs, then it is not significant in the 
BoundaryRich, BoundaryPoor, and InteriorPoor setups.  Looking further into no-agent decisions, 
endowment does not play a significant role in private allocations when no-agent decisions 
occupy the first twenty rounds of a session.  Wealth design is only significant in the boundary 
design, meaning that BoundaryRich no-agent decisions are different than BoundaryPoor 
decisions.  This wealth design effect is not present in the interior design.  There does seem to be 
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a significant pooled order effect in no-agent decisions at the 5% level, meaning that no-agent 
decisions in the first 20 rounds are different than those in the second 20 rounds after an agent 
treatment has been played.  This order effect is also broken down into wealth designs to show if 
there is an order effect in no-agent decisions in each solution and wealth design. 
The analysis of Table 18 can also be applied to agent rounds, specifically low-endowed 
agent decisions and high-endowed agent decisions.  The size of a subject’s endowment is 
significant in all agent decisions in every design and in every session.  For both poor and wealthy 
agents, their allocation decisions are affected by their own wealth.  The wealth design is 
significant only for boundary high-endowed agents and interior low-endowed agents.  For these 
two groups, their decisions were affected by the overall wealth composition of their group.  The 
pooled order effect is not significant for most agent decisions except low agent decisions in the 
boundary design.  Only for these agents did their decisions vary by whether their agent decisions 
occupied the first twenty rounds of the experiment. 
2.5 CONCLUSION 
Agents in public good games have the opportunity to improve individual and social welfare 
through their coordinative allocations.  Free-riding in private giving often creates inefficiency 
and poor social outcomes, and thus, agents present a natural alternative to individual giving 
environments.  Social welfare does increase in this experiment when an agent is introduced, and 
thus, it is not surprising that agency is implemented in 70-90% of voting rounds.   
Adding a wealth distribution among group members to test the robustness of agent 
efficiency over private giving creates a circumstance where choosing optimality as the agent is 
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not optimal for the group.  In general, agents faced with wealth heterogeneity in their group do 
not make Pareto-efficient allocation decisions.  By identifying themselves by their wealth group, 
agents seek to increase their profits through the use of a predatory allocation strategy which 
places the majority, if not all, of the burden of the public good on the other wealth group.  This 
predatory strategy on the part of a wealthy agent dramatically subtracts from the potential profits 
of those who started off already worse off, skewing group wealth even further.  Even though a 
wealthy agent's predatory action may appear more unfair, poor agents actually take more 
predatory action than the wealthy by allocating greater percentages of their endowments to the 
group account.   
Overall private contributions to the public good are smaller with a wealth distribution 
than when wealth is equalized, presenting a similar result to previous literature.  However, the 
burden of provision for the public good in no-agent rounds is not affected by the wealth 
distribution.  The poor in each group provide around half of the public good in most rounds, 
splitting the burden of the public good with the wealthy. 
Introducing diversification in agent decisions through inequality in wealth among group 
members provides realistic extension to research in public-good decision making.  The benefits 
of agency become entangled with issues of equity, wealth, and overall provision of the public 
good.  The ability to show favoritism to the agent's own group is established with the addition of 
two allocation decisions.  Combined with the wealth distribution addition, it is difficult to 
determine which addition might be causing some of these results.   
A natural, next step to answering this question of predatory action, equity, and the benefit 
of an agent is to investigate agent giving when subjects are classified into groups without wealth 
context.  Such an experiment would be very similar to this one except instead of wealth groups, 
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subjects would be distinguished by some arbitrary name such as type A and type B.  Then, 
agents would be able to single themselves out in order to show favoritism to their own group but 
would not be confronted with issues of wealth and equity.  After this investigation, we will be 
able to discern which results are the effect of the ability to take predatory action or which are the 
result of wealth heterogeneity. 
2.6 APPENDICES 
2.6.1 Appendix A: Experiment Instructions, Questionnaires, and Tables 
2.6.1.1 Experiment Instructions 
The following instructions come from the first 20 rounds of the Boundary Poor wealth design 
where agent decisions occupy these beginning rounds.  For the Rich wealth design and no-agent 
treatment design changes, only small changes to the instructions would occur.  For an example 
of the interior instructions, please see Wick (2008). 
This is an experiment in decision making. The Department of Economics has provided 
funds for this research. During the course of the experiment, you will make a series of decisions. 
You will be paid for participating, and the amount of money you earn depends on the decisions 
that you and the other participants make. At the end of today's session you will be paid privately 
and in cash for your decisions. Please do not talk to one another for the duration of the 
experiment. 
The first phase of the experiment will consist of 20 rounds. When these rounds have 
elapsed, please wait for further instruction. 
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At the beginning of the experiment, everyone is randomly assigned to a group of 5 
individuals in the first round. During the course of the experiment, your group composition does 
not change. You will be in a group with the same 4 other members for the experiment. All 
decisions you make in this experiment are anonymous; therefore, please do not reveal any of 
your decisions to any other participant. 
At the beginning of each round, each of you will be gifted with a number of tokens in his 
or her private account. These tokens can be invested between two accounts: the group account 
and your own private account. Each member of the group will have a different amount of tokens 
gifted to them at the beginning of every period depending on their type. Your token gift at the 
beginning of each period is called your endowment. Three type-1 group members have an 
endowment of 75 tokens, and two type-2 group members have an endowment of 200 tokens. 
When each round starts, you will be asked to make a decision as the agent of the group 
about how many tokens each member of your group must allocate to the group account. Thus, 
each of you will decide how many tokens both type-1 and type-2 group members must contribute 
to the group account. Tokens not contributed to the group account remain in your private 
account. The number of tokens in the group account equals the total amount of what the agent 
decides each person will contribute. 
    After each member of the group has made decisions about token allocations, then one member 
will be chosen at random to be the group agent and their decision about the group allocation will 
be implemented. 
    Your payment depends on the number of tokens remaining in your private account, and the 
total number of tokens contributed to the group account at the end of each round. For each token 
remaining in your private account at the end of the round, you earn 2.2 points. For each token in 
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the group account, you and each member of your group will receive 0.7 points. Your total payoff 
for each round is the sum of your earnings from the private and the group account, and will 
indicated on your computer screen. Earnings from the group account depend only on the total 
number of tokens in that account. 
Your earnings from the experiment will be drawn from the decisions from one round out 
chosen at random plus the $5 show up fee. The exchange rate for points to dollars is 1 point=2 
cents. Thus, 300 points=$6. At the end of the experiment, you will be asked to come to the side 
room where you will be paid in private. 
If you have a question while the experiment is going on, please raise your hand and one 
of us will come to your desk and answer it. At this time, do you have any questions about the 
instructions or procedures? 
Questionnaire: We will now allow time to answer a questionnaire to make sure that all 
participants understand other important features of the instructions. Please fill it out now. Do not 
put your name on the questionnaire. We will then go over the relevant part of the instructions. 
2.6.1.2   Questionnaires 
The following is the questionnaire that would accompany the above instructions.  Each set of 
instructions was followed by a similar set of questions based on the agent, no-agent, or voting 
treatment for those rounds as well as background conditions of the experiment.21
    1.   (True or False) Players remain in the same group of 5 players in all rounds of experiment. 
                                                 
21 There was a set of instructions every 20 rounds as treatments changed. 
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    2. If the chosen agent of the group decides each type 1 individual must contribute 30 tokens 
and each type 2 individual must contribute 125 tokens to the group account, how many tokens 
will be in the group account at the end of the period? 
     a.   If you are a type 1 player, how many tokens remain in your private account? 
     b.   If you are a type 2 player, how many tokens remain in your private account? 
    3.   (True or False) Each player makes an allocation decision for the group every round but 
only one allocation is chosen. 
2.6.1.3 Tables Given to Subjects 
The tables given to subjects in this experiment are the same as Tables 6, 7, and 8 from the 
previous experiment. 
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2.6.2 Appendix B: Figures 
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Figure 17: InteriorPoor Agent Contributions for Low Endowment Subjects by Frequency 
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Figure 18: InteriorPoor Agent Contributions for High Endowment Subjects by Frequency 
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Figure 19: BoundaryPoor Agent Contributions for Low Endowment Subjects by Frequency 
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Figure 20: BoundaryPoor Agent Contributions for High Endowment Subjects by Frequency 
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
0.35
0.4
0.45
0.5
=0 0≤x≤5 5≤x≤10 10≤x≤25 25≤x≤40 40≤x<50 =50
Contribution Interval
Fr
eq
ue
nc
y
Low Agent
High Agent
 
Figure 21: InteriorRich Agent Contributions for Low Endowment Subjects by Frequency 
 91 
00.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
0.35
0.4
0.45
0.5
=0
=1
75
Contribution Interval
Fr
eq
ue
nc
y
Low Agent
High Agent
 
Figure 22: InteriorRich Agent Contributions for High Endowment Subjects by Frequency 
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Figure 23: BoundaryRich Agent Contributions for Low Endowment Subjects by Frequency 
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Figure 24: BoundaryRich Agent Contributions for High Endowment Subjects by Frequency 
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3.0  SWITCHING COSTS IN CONTRACT INDUSTRIES WITH TWO TYPES OF 
CUSTOMERS 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
A switching cost is an expense incurred by an individual for changing from whom they purchase 
a given product. Switching costs can have serious implications for markets. They are often 
artificially created by companies to create loyalty, yet they can have significant backlashes in 
efficiency such as preventing entry of new firms and keeping prices high above the competitive 
price.  In the cellular telephone industry before November 2003, when a customer decided to 
switch their cellular provider, they incurred a large implicit switching cost of losing your current 
telephone number on top of set up costs with the new company.  In addition, any switching 
customer might face an explicit contract-break fee and implicit costs of learning a new network. 
Examples of switching costs are prevalent in most industries because firms try to hold onto their 
customers' business to increase their profits. Paul Klemperer has a long list of reasons for how 
these switching costs induce brand loyalty in his 1995 article. 
For companies, the existence of switching costs on the part of their customers has very 
desirable properties. They keep customers locked in to purchasing their products, allowing them 
to charge a higher price and create more profits.  In theory, this occurs because switching costs 
reduce consumers' price elasticity of demand. Paul Klemperer has an extensive literature on the 
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theory of switching costs and their attractive qualities to companies. Klemperer not only 
comments on the seemingly positive aspects of switching costs but also on their draw backs 
especially with respect to the decrease in consumers' surplus and social welfare (1987b). Using a 
symmetric equilibrium argument, Klemperer's general model calls attention to non-cooperative 
behavior which in the presence of this expense to switch leads to outcomes that appear collusive. 
This is a result that is observed in this model as well. 
The main problem of creating switching costs to establish loyalty and increase profits is 
that firms are extracting away from consumer surplus and creating social dead weight losses by 
not allowing for efficient outcomes since switching costs deter entry of new firms who price 
competitively and possibly drive the market price to competitive equilibrium (Klemperer 1987a, 
1988). 
In this theoretical paper, I model an industry that is faced with contracts as a source of 
pricing strategy. This paper investigates a duopoly faced with designing contracts to maximize 
their profits based on the behavior of their competitor.  The contract itself presents its own form 
of switching cost because breaking the agreement early causes the consumer to have to pay the 
provider a termination fee, an explicit cost to switch. When consumers are locked into a price for 
the duration of a contract, then a company can practice price discrimination, charging them a 
higher price (as specified in the contract) than new consumers who are offered a lower price to 
capture their business.   
Klemperer proves in a multi-period model that once customers are locked into a price, 
they face higher prices in early periods than new customers in subsequent periods (1995). In an 
industry where a firm cannot use discriminatory practices in any period, companies face a trade-
off, whether to continue charging a high price to locked-in consumers or to charge a lower price 
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in order to capture new consumers as well as maintaining the old ones (Klemperer 1995). 
Furthermore, Klemperer finds that prices to both new and old customers are higher than they are 
in a market without switching costs.  In the present paper, I analyze similar issues in an 
environment where firms can sign contracts with customers, who vary in the extent of the 
switching costs they experience. 
The contract framework provides another source of trouble for markets with switching 
costs in terms of efficiency. Specifically, they create the problem preventing competition among 
firms in a market to drive competition to the fullest extent. Aghion and Bolton see these 
contracts as creating negative externalities that allow the incumbent to extract some of the 
entrant's surplus and therefore create a barrier to entry (1987).  These barriers from switching 
costs are not discussed in this paper. 
Moreover, companies try to prey on their competitors' customers by proposing luring 
attractive introductory offers to lock them into contract at a high price (Doyle 1986). We see 
examples of this in the cell phone industry where a customer must pay a high price in a contract 
for a certain number of minutes but might get "pulled" in by an offer of a free cell phone. Doyle 
is arguing that companies often pay a customer's setup costs, such as the cost of a new phone, in 
order to attract them to sign a contract. Chen calls this "paying customers to switch" (1997). A 
company frequently gives customers a fixed amount of money or an introductory offer in order 
to entice them to switch.  These luring payments can play a significant part in explaining pricing, 
but I do not specifically study them in this paper since they add one more pricing affect to an 
already complex model. 
Chen's results in his 1997 paper are closely related to what is studied in this paper, with a 
few exceptions.  In Chen’s paper, he considers a two-period model where in the first period new 
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customers can be “paid” to purchase from a company who offers a luring, low price.  In the 
second period, prices increase, and profits for the firm suffer due to offering these introductory 
prices.  There are no contracts with associated fees or customers locked-in to purchasing from a 
particular producer; he considers the same pool of customers during two periods.   
In contract markets, there exist groups that are locked into previous prices and therefore 
have associated switching costs from changing providers.  In addition, there are new customers 
who have not signed contracts and therefore face no such switching costs.  At any given period 
of time, firms cannot tell if a customer approaching them for service is a buyer who has 
previously consumed the product from another provider or if he is a new buyer who has never 
purchased from the producer.  Therefore, firms can charge one set of prices to a group of old 
customers who are locked into their contracts and another set of prices to their incoming 
customers who are shopping around for a deal.   
This fight over new customers and those whose contracts have expired creates a great 
deal of competition in markets with switching costs. It is in these cases that the competition can 
become quite intense.  Firms can gain profits by continuing to charge high prices even when 
facing a group of new customers.  Therefore, old customers never find it appealing to switch to 
another option.  In addition, firms can gain profits by cutting price to drastically in a new period 
that they gain all new customers and old customers would switch from their current provider, 
lured by the low price. 
When a company is making the decision based on this trade-off, it is faced with 
maximizing its total expected profits by trying to keep as many of their old customers as 
possible. They want to make sure they keep their customers marginally happy at some fixed 
utility value. This approach has been taken by Farrell and Shapiro (1989) in trying to discover 
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what is the optimal contract that a firm can offer given that it has to try to keep customers 
marginally happy with their product.  What they neglected to study in their paper is how new 
customers' entry and different types of switching costs affect those optimal contracts to be 
offered in every period. 
My goal in this paper is to model an environment with both new and old customers where 
buyers face implicit switching costs, a private signal, and explicit costs specified in a customer's 
contract. Sellers maximize expected profits by choosing the contract terms with both new and 
old customers.  The firms compete in an infinitely repeated game.  I characterize the properties 
of the steady-state of this dynamic environment derived from a Hotelling model of competition 
between two differentiated firms. 
The results obtained in this paper reinforce many of those obtained in the literature.  
There exist collusive outcomes where the firms can take advantage of their contacted old 
customers and extract their entire surplus just as shown in Klemperer's 1987 paper.  I also find a 
higher price charged to old customers than to new customers, just like Klemperer found in his 
1995 paper.  I also characterize another equilibrium which is Pareto-inferior from the perspective 
of the firms.  In this equilibrium, as the expected value of customers' implicit switching costs 
decreases, the prices and fees charged to old customers decrease.  This result implies that when 
customers find it easier to switch among firms, price competition intensifies.   
The equilibrium prices and fees charged to both old and new consumers are independent 
of the number of them in the market.  Their number only influences the profit of the firm.  This is 
to mirror many industries which have very small (approaching zero) costs for each additional 
customer they have on their service. This result is possibly implied by the demand structure 
assumed in the model, where customers demand the good with perfect inelasticity. 
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In my model, there exists a dead weight loss to society due to these switching costs and 
the actual switching taking place in the inferior equilibrium.  On the other hand, the collusive 
outcomes, which allow the firm to exact the entirety of the representative consumer surplus in a 
period, are Pareto optimal because they maximize social welfare.  Since demand is assumed to 
be perfectly inelastic in the model, the results may change with a different demand structure. 
3.2 THEORETICAL MODEL 
3.2.1 Companies’ Pricing Profiles 
 p    price to old customers locked into contracts 
q    fee to break contract if old customer leaves 
m    price to new customers which may include explicit setup costs 
3.2.2 Representative Company i pricing strategy 
n      locked in customers 
φi    probability of customer switching (This can also be thought of as the proportion of old 
customers who switch from using i's product at the current contract prices pi and qi.)  
Therefore, (1-φi) is firm i's market share of old customers. 
 r     pool of new customers 
λi    proportion of new customers that i captures  
y      location of the firm on a line reflecting the distribution of preferences of customers 
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x     customer's implicit switching cost, unknown to the company. The distribution of the 
implicit switching cost is common knowledge. 
The probability that a customer switches is a function of his implicit switching cost and 
the prices and explicit costs set by each firm. Therefore, when a seller chooses a contract 
strategy, it affects their own profits and indirectly the probability that a given customer switches 
to a different provider.  This is an important aspect of the setup because the choices made in the 
contract strategy of a seller have both direct effects (profits) and indirect effects (loyalty and 
customer switching).  The properties of the new customers who choose each firm is 
endogenously determined in the model by the prices the firms select. 
3.2.2.1 For New Customers 
λi, the proportion of new customers captured with by firm i, is determined by a simple, one-
dimensional Hotelling model, with i located at one of the extremes, as follows: 
     If mi + αqi + ty ≤ mj + αqj + t(1-y), a customer prefers i over j.  Consumers in a Hotelling 
model have preferences for both the utility obtained from a particular company’s characteristics 
(such as prices and fees) as well as its geographic location in relation to their preferences.  t is a 
transportation cost associated with a  customer’s preferences for geographic location and is 
incurred they sign a contract with a particular company located a specified distance from their 
preferences. 
Therefore, 
t
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1 1ααλ +−++= , by solving for the indifferent new customer. 
α measures an uncertainty factor, for consumers are not certain a particular company will 
line up with their preferences in the future. Since new customers are choosing in one period a 
company with whom to sign a contract for more than one period, they face uncertainty about 
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how the company's product will align with their preferences. They might decide they do not like 
the product at some point in their contract, and therefore be forced to incur a break fee to later 
switch companies. 
3.2.2.2 For Old Customers 
When considering the choices of old customers, the analysis become a little more 
complicated since the probability that a firm keeps an old customer depends on the prices they 
are charged in their contract, how their current company aligns with their preferences, how much 
the other firm is charging to new customers, how well the other firm aligns with their preferences 
both now and in the future, and how much it costs them to switch.  For old customers to switch, 
they incur their contract break fee plus their implicit switching cost x.  
The implicit switching cost x is distributed uniform from [0,θ].  This is a model of two 
symmetric firms competing for both old customers, who have signed contracts in the past, and 
new customers, who are completely new to the market.  Also, these two firms are differentiated 
providers of a good in the market.  Therefore, this model is centered a two-dimensional Hotelling 
model with the implicit switching costs on the x-axis and the placement of the firms along the y-
axis.  For simplicity, assume that firm i is located at 0 and firm j is located at 1. See Figure 25 for 
graphic representation.  One of the questions I attempt to answer in this paper is how changes in 
the distribution of implicit switching cost affect the equilibrium prices. 
The probability that firm i keeps an old customer (1-φi) is affected by both x, the 
customer's implicit switching costs, and y, his location, as follows: 
 If xtyqqmtyp ijji +−+++≤+ )1(α , then an old customer prefers i over j. 
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If this inequality is satisfied, then an old customer is not willing to switch from their 
current provider firm i to firm j.  The price in their contract plus the total transportation cost of 
where the firm in located has to be less than the price that j is offering new customers plus the 
transportation cost to choose firm j, the contract break fee from i, the total aversion of signing a 
new contract for j, and that customer's individual private switching cost signal.  Solving for y 
yields the set of customers who stay with i as follows: 
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Thus, the model becomes a Hotelling model in two dimensions. Old customers make 
their staying or switching decisions based on two factors outside the control of the firm: the 
location of the firm in their preferences, y, and their implicit switching cost, x. 
1 
Location 
of Firms 
i and j 
Distribution of Customer Implicit Switching Costs 
0 
Case 1 
Case 3 
Case 2
1| =yx  
y(0) 
θ 
 
Figure 25: Two Dimensional Hotelling Model for Old Customers 
An upward-sloping line in Figure 25 represents those customers who are indifferent 
between switching or staying with i.  It shows where the group of old customers are indifferent 
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between choosing firm i or firm j based on their implicit switching cost, which is a private signal 
to the customer, and the location of each company. 
The proportion of old customers a firm i keeps, (1-φi), is the area under the line of 
indifference in each case.  The proportion of old customers that switch from firm i, φi, is the area 
above the line of indifference in each case. 
The y-intercept, y(0), is chosen to be positive for the purposes of this graph.  The 
intercept could take on any value in [-1,1].  It is necessary for 1 ≥ y(0) ≥ -1 since this is a 
Hotelling model of a duopoly where it is exogenously given that the distance between the two 
firms is 1.  The intercept in this model cannot exceed the distance set between the duopolists. 
The positive intercept means that there is a proportion of customers having the lowest switching 
costs who continue choose firm i because of its location in relation to their preferences. A 
negative intercept means that a given proportion of customers with the lowest switching costs 
choose to switch from provider i because of its location in relation to their preferences. 
Using the above inequality for y from the old customer's purchasing decision, I can solve 
for the intercepts of this two-dimensional Hotelling model.   In the above inequality, y is a 
function of x so I continue to use that notation in order to mathematically solve for the values of 
the intercepts of the Hotelling model. 
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Assume 0 < y(0) < 1 (as depicted in Figure 25 above) 
tt <+<− iijj p-q+qm α  
Call ijR≡+ iijj p-q+qm α  
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The values of  are important in differentiating among the different cases for each 
equilibrium. 
ijR
Figure 25 depicts the three different cases that might arise in describing the indifference 
line of old consumers.  Case 1 is such that those who are old customers of firm i with the highest 
implicit switching costs are always deterred from switching.  Case 2 allows those old customers 
with the highest values of switching costs in the distribution to be exactly indifferent between 
switching.  Case 3 allows a proportion of old customers locked into firm i's contracts with the 
highest costs to switch to firm j.  This case is a bit counter-intuitive and works out 
mathematically to take the same shape as case 1. Therefore, we restrict our attention to the case 
where customers at the top of the distribution of switching costs always remain loyal to their 
contracts and their current provider, case 1. 
3.2.3 Firm i’s Problem 
 
 Since the old customers are already locked into contracts at pi and qi, they are making choices 
about whether to stay with their current provider.  In firm i's problem above, the company keeps 
an old customer, l, with probability (1-φi) and therefore obtains the contract price net of marginal 
cost which is assumed to be zero.  If an old customer decides to opt out of their contract, which 
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occurs with probability φi, he has to pay firm i a break fee qi.  Firm i captures a proportion λi of 
new customers; thus, the profit from new customers is amount of customers attracted to firm i at 
their contracted price, mi. 
The firm's problem is set up as a profit maximization problem with both new and old 
customers aggregated into one period.  Thus, the firm is trying to decide what to offer those who 
are approaching them for contracts today, who become old customers in the near future, at the 
same time as deciding contract prices to the next set of customers who will come to them after 
these "old" customers are locked into contracts.   Each firm is forward looking in its contract 
pricing decisions, and therefore is simultaneously making decisions for contracts that are given at 
different points in time.  Therefore at one stage of this infinitely-repeated game, firms are 
designing contracts for both types of customers who approach them sequentially. 
The "old" customers were not always old, but in this model when the firm was deciding 
what prices to set for their group of consumers it was also deciding the pricing scheme for their 
next group of customers.  In effect the firm is making its multi-period decisions simultaneously 
just as if it had a high discount rate (very close to one).  In effect, these periods are very small 
since as soon as a customer signs a contract, he becomes an old customer due to the fact he is 
"locked-in" to consuming from his contracted firm.  The price at which a customer signs a 
contract is the going price they face in all periods unless he decides either to resign with the same 
company when his term is up or to switch to another company and become its new customer.   
Firms are trying to find steady-state pricing behavior for this infinitely-repeated game in a 
market where they are facing two types of consumers who contract with them at different points 
in time. 
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3.3 SYMMETRIC EQUILIBRIUM ANALYSIS 
In this section, I show that this model has three symmetric equilibria: two collusive equilibria, 
and one which is Pareto inferior with an associated dead weight loss.22  First, we have to be able 
to find intersection points and boundaries on Figure 25, which determine our various cases in this 
paper, to further characterize the profit maximization problem of the firm. 
3.3.1 Cases 1 and 2 - 1)( ≥θy  
This condition y(θ) ≥ 1 implies that the line of indifference of the Hotelling model from Figure 
25 either intersects the upper-right hand corner of the figure (where x = θ, y = 1) or intersects the 
upper boundary of the figure. 
 θ−≥⇒ tRij  
  This property is derived by looking at the equation above for y(θ). 
If 2t ≥ θ or (t-θ ≥ -t)  t-θ ≤ R⇒ ij < t. 
If 2t < θ or (t-θ < -t) ⇒  -t  < Ri j< t. 
These properties are derived by looking at the conditions for the assumption that  
0 < y(0) < 1. 
Thus, ijiijj1=y R-t=]p-q+q+[m-t= |x α . 
                                                 
22  Asymmetric equilibria are not considered due to the complexity of the model. 
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3.3.2 Case 3 - y(θ) < 1 
This condition, y(θ) < 1, implies that the line of indifference of the Hotelling model from Figure 
25 intersects the right boundary of the figure. 
       -t < R⇒ ij < t-θ, possible only if 2t > θ 
Also, we need to know the market share or proportion of old customers a firm keeps, (1-
φi), in the maximization problem.  This proportion for firm i is calculated by looking at the area 
under the lines of indifference from Figure 25 since these are the customers who decide not to 
switch. 
3.3.3 Market Share of Old Customers  )1( iφ−  for Cases 1 and 2 
The market share of old customers is defined as the area under the lines in Figure 25.  They are 
those customers who do not switch from using our representative firm i′s product. 
 
3.3.4 Profit Maximization for Cases 1 and 2 
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3.3.5 General First-Order and Second-Order Conditions 
 
 
Therefore, the second order condition is generally satisfied for cases 1 and 2.  As we see 
in a later in section 3.8, under certain parameter restrictions, case 1 has a divergent second order 
condition, meaning its second derivative is positive at the equilibrium solution which is a 
violation of the second order condition. Therefore, case 1 does not survive as an inferior 
equilibrium of this model. 
 
3.3.5.1 Solving First- and Second-Order Conditions Explicitly 
 
 
Thus, when the solution for pi is interior to the firm’s decision space, the first-order condition for 
the break fee is positive or negative depending on the size of the old customer population.  If the 
set of old customers is quite large with respect to the pool of new customers, then the firm’s 
profit increases as the break fee increases.  The firm has more to gain from high break fees in an 
effort to retain their locked-in customers.  
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3.4 FIRST COLLUSIVE SYMMETRIC EQUILIBRIUM 
If 
t
rmn i
2
α> , then the number of old customers outweighs the rate at which a firm can gain new 
customers in this symmetric model, which depends on how uncertain customers are about how 
firms align with their preferences in the future, the transportation cost, and the price that firm i 
charges its new comers.  Since the number of old customers is relatively big in comparison to the 
rate of gaining new customers, each firm wants to choose the maximum qi for their contracts to 
induce high consumer loyalty to their product.  Meaning, old customers do not want to switch 
from their current provider to pay the break fee.   
Therefore one of two above conditions from cases 1 and 2 apply: 
  
Thus in both cases, a firm wants to choose maximum qi such that Rij reaches the limit of 
its maximum value (Rij = t).   
If  , then tRij = 0>=∏ ndp
dE
i
.  Since there are always increasing returns to increasing 
the price, then the firm sets pi at its greatest possible value. 
If firms are going to exploit the highest price from their old customers, they set pi = v-t 
where v is the maximum reservation price of a representative customer.  So the firm is charging a 
price such that all old customers still want to buy from them because the price is such that it 
subtracts the highest possible transportation cost.  Therefore the farthest away customer from 
firm i, who would incur the entire transportation cost of t, still purchases from them since they 
are indifferent between their product and switching to j.  The first order conditions become: 
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Therefore, i wants to choose the smallest break fee, qi, consistent with this new region. 
Proposition 1: There exists a collusive equilibrium to this model where an old customer 
does not switch from their current provider at their given contract. 
For the mathematic derivation of the equilibrium, please see 3.8.1 Appendix A. 
Characteristics of this collusive symmetric equilibrium: 
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 The graphic representation of this equilibrium in the two-dimensional Hotelling model is 
seen in Figure 26. 
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y(0) = 1 
 
Location of 
Firms i and j 
Customer Implicit Switching Costs
All 
customers 
remain loyal 
and never 
pay contract 
break fee. 
 
Figure 26: First Collusive Outcome 
  Since the area under the line of indifference is those who do not switch from their 
current provider (firm i), in this equilibrium no one switches, and each firm gets p = v - t from all 
old customers and mi = mj = t from .
2
1 r  
In this equilibrium, both firms are pursuing a collusive equilibrium.  To their old 
customers, these duopolists are acting together as a monopoly in this Hotelling model and 
achieving the highest possible profit from the market.  Therefore, this equilibrium has some 
attractive properties that most models with switching costs do not posses.  There is no dead 
weight loss since all consumer welfare is transferred directly into the producer's profit.  These 
duopolists are extracting all the possible surplus rents from their old customers. From an 
efficiency standpoint, this collusive outcome without switching is Pareto optimal.  Also, due to 
the lack of switching taking place in equilibrium, the equilibrium is very stable. 
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3.5 SECOND COLLUSIVE SYMMETRIC OUTCOME 
This equilibrium is also involves a collusive outcome between firms i and j, but this equilibrium 
brings about an exact opposite result from the first collusive outcome.  To best illustrate this 
equilibrium, see the Hotelling model for this equilibrium Figure 27. 
0 θ 
1
Location of 
firms i and j 
Customer Implicit Switching Costs
Every old 
customer 
switches and 
incurs the 
contract 
break fee.
y(0) 
 
Figure 27: Second Collusive Outcome 
As seen above in Figure 27, from the perspective of firm i, all of its old customers switch 
from using their product to provider j since the entirety of the area of the two-dimensional 
Hotelling model lies above the line of indifference. 
Proposition 2: There exists a collusive equilibrium to this model where every old 
customer switches from their current provider at their given contract as seen in Figure 
27.    
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For the mathematic derivation of the equilibrium, please see 3.8.2 Appendix B. 
Thus, the characterization of this second collusive symmetric equilibrium is: 
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Since every customer switches from their old providers and pays the break fee, each firm 
chooses q = v - t to maximize their profit. 
The difference from this equilibrium to the first is that it induces all old customers to 
switch companies in every period and therefore pay the break fee to their current provider.  
Compared to the results from this equilibrium, the first Pareto-optimal equilibrium set symmetric 
lower prices and lower break fees such that the old, loyal customers are not "lured" away by the 
pricing scheme to new customers from the competitor. When prices to old customers and explicit 
switching costs (break fees) are both higher, all customers are lured by the low prices (mj = mi = 
t) to new customers by the competitor, and therefore each old customer is willing to pay the 
break fee to switch companies in every period.   
This result is not only different to the first in terms of the prices charged but also in terms 
of the large amounts of switching taking place.  In the first collusive equilibrium, customers 
remain loyal to their contracts, and in this equilibrium, we see customers being completely 
disloyal to their contracts.  Customers never pay their switching costs in the first equilibrium, but 
in this equilibrium, they always do.  Since customers are paying their explicit and implicit 
switching costs, they have a smaller surplus which can be extracted by the firms.  Therefore, this 
equilibrium is inferior to the first collusive outcome.  Despite its inferiority, this equilibrium is 
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still collusive since firms can symmetrically impose switching costs to increase profits and reach 
a collusive monopolistic outcome. 
3.6 PARETO INFERIOR SYMMETRIC EQUILIBRIUM 
I restrict attention to the region where θ > 3t so that only one case of the Pareto inferior 
symmetric equilibrium survives (case 2 from Figure 25).  Cases 1 and 3 have divergent contract 
solutions under these conditions, meaning their second derivatives are positive at the equilibrium 
solution.  Under these restrictions, I can characterize a Pareto-inferior equilibrium with switching 
where only some customers switch, creating a positive dead weight loss.  This equilibrium is also 
inferior from the point of view of the firm because it brings lower profits and prices than the 
collusive equilibria.  The details of the solution are as follows.  For details on cases 1 and 3, see 
3.8.3 and 3.8.5 Appendices C and E respectively. 
3.6.1 If 2t  < θ ⇒  Rij = -t 
This condition comes from the lower bound of Rij when y(θ) ≤ 1 and 2t < θ.   I have chosen the 
lower bound of Rij since because when y(θ) ≤ 1, the firm keeps more old customers than it 
loses.23  Under these conditions, I also assume 
t
rmn i
2
α> just as in the first collusive equilibrium.  
Therefore, the number of old customers outweighs the rate at which a firm can gain new 
                                                 
23 More customers stay with their product than who switch to the competitor. See Figure 28 and explanation 
below. 
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customers in this symmetric model.  The rate at which a firm can gain new customers depends on 
how uncertain customers are about how firms will align with their preferences in the future, the 
transportation cost, and the price that firm i charges its new comers. 
Proposition 3:  There exists an equilibrium in this region which is inferior to the 
collusive equilibria from the point of view of the firm. 
In 3.8.4 Appendix D, I derive the equilibrium and show its inferiority from the point of 
view of the firm. 
The characterization of the inferior equilibrium in case 2 is: 
 
The following comparative statics with respect to the break fee q and p hold: 
 
Therefore, the explicit switching cost and price for each individual customer varies 
inversely with the transportation cost, t, and the uncertainty factor, α, but it varies directly with θ.  
This is a logical explanation of behavior in equilibrium.  This form of the inferior equilibrium is 
plausible mostly because of the comparative statics with respect to θ.  Firms do not know what 
kind of inconvenience individual customers face to switch companies to their product, but they 
do know the distribution of these implicit costs.  As the distribution of these costs, θ, increases, 
companies can take advantage of the fact that it is a large hassle for their customers to switch 
from consuming their product and charge them higher prices to consume their product.  But if an 
exogenous change occurs that causes θ to decrease, then companies have to compete more 
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heavily to keep their customers and charge lower prices and contract fees.24  Therefore making 
switching between companies less of a hassle creates more aggressive competition amongst firm 
in prices and fees for customers. 
y(0) = 0 θ 
1
Location 
of firms 
i and j 
Customer Implicit Switching Costs 
2t 
 
Figure 28: Inferior Equilibrium Case 2 
What one may notice about this graphic representation of this Hotelling model versus the 
collusive outcomes seen earlier in this paper, is that there is some area above the line of 
indifference and the area below the line of indifference.  This is highly important, for this 
represents the amount of loyalty and disloyalty in the market.  The area above the indifference 
line shows the amount of switching in the equilibrium, and it is this switching which brings 
about the inferiority of this equilibrium because it creates dead weight losses to society.   
                                                 
24 An example on an exogenous change on θ is the portability of cellular telephone numbers between 
carriers in 2003. 
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Collusion may not be sustainable if firms follow trigger strategies to punish their 
counterparts in this market.  Therefore, the inferior outcome can survive as an equilibrium in 
spite of the fact that there is a much more desirable outcome under collusion in the market from 
the point of view of the firm.  i and j can view this option as their contract pricing option if their 
competitor refuses to cooperate in the stage game.  Though it is not as efficient or as profitable as 
the collusive equilibrium, this inferior outcome can provide a credible threat to cooperation if 
firms have a high enough discount rate over periods of the stage game.  It is an unprofitable 
deviation if firms do not discount the future heavily. 
3.6.2 Implications of Inferior Equilibrium 
For the derivation of case 2 as the dominant equilibrium under the parameter restriction, please 
see 3.8.6 Appendix F. 
3.6.2.1 Amount of Switching in Inferior Equilibrium 
This section looks to the amount of switching that the inferior equilibrium.   
The amount of switching, call it γ, in Case 2 is equal to φi or the area above the 
indifference line. 
 
Since t > 0 is a assumed condition of this model, there is always a positive amount of 
switching in this inferior equilibrium.  More switching occurs as the transportation cost increases 
or as customers choose companies that are not closest to their preferences. 
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3.6.2.2 Dead Weight Loss Associated with Switching 
Each old customer has reservation value of v, new customers have a reservation value of β, and 
the maximum attainable expected profit for each firm is 
2
)( rttvnE +−=∏ .25  Therefore, we 
can calculate deadweight losses by investigating the total welfare in case 2 versus the Pareto- 
optimal equilibrium.   
Proposition 4: There exists a positive dead weight loss to society due to switching in the 
inferior equilibrium. 
     For complete mathematic derivation, please see 3.8.7 Appendix G. 
 
If v satisfies tttv +⎟⎠
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⎛ −+−> α
θ
θ
θ 3)( 2 ,  then the collusive equilibrium brings more profit 
to the firm.26  If we assume that colluding in a duopoly brings more profits to each firm, then this 
inequality is always satisfied. 
Therefore, there is a positive dead weight loss in the inferior equilibrium.  A cost to 
society exists with these contractual switching costs in place.  This dead weight loss exists since 
                                                 
25 as seen in Pareto-optimal equilibria 
26 as shown in 3.8.7 Appendix D 
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if customers decide to switch and pay their switching costs, then firms cannot extract their 
surplus to the same extent.  If customers pay their implicit switching cost, it becomes not only a 
source of loss to the customer but also to the firms since neither of them receive that cost as 
revenue.  If collusion breaks down, then the industry finds itself at this inferior equilibrium 
which creates an overall loss from switching. 
3.6.2.3 Trigger Strategy 
For it to be profitable for firms to use this inferior equilibrium as a trigger strategy (credible 
threat), they have to have high discount rate for the future.  If collusion succeeds, then firms 
enjoy 
2
)( rttvnE +−=∏ , call it 
2
m∏ , in every period.  If a firm becomes greedy and decides to 
under cut their competitor's price to capture all the profits in the market Πm,  its competitor might 
price according to the inferior equilibrium to punish the deviator with corresponding profits 
2
3)( 2 rttntnE +⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ −+−=∏ α
θ
θ
θ which we call .  Therefore, for this trigger strategy to be 
profitable the discount rate, δ, has to be such that: δ > 
inf∏
)(2 inf∏−∏
∏
m
m
.  For mathematic derivation, 
please see 3.8.8 Appendix H.  Since I have assumed that firms have a high discount rate (close to 
one) in order to aggregate their pricing behavior decisions for new and old customers, this 
inequality should be satisfied. 
3.6.2.4 Coordination Failure 
The possibility does exist that the market may start out pricing according to the inferior 
equilibrium, even though it is more profitable for both firms to collude.  In this situation, i and j 
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may find themselves in coordination failure and would like to move to the collusive outcome to 
achieve higher profits.   To do this, either i or j (for simplicity let us assume that i without loss of 
generality) has to take the lead and set prices and fees according to one of the collusive equilibria 
in order to signal to its counterpart that they are willing to price high if j is willing to price high. 
Firm i, the "leading firm," takes a big hit to its revenues because it suffers zero profits for the 
period it is trying to signal to j.  Firm i only finds it beneficial to take this "hit" against their 
expected profits if its discount factor satisfies the following: δ > m∏
∏inf2 .27  It is always beneficial 
for firm j to follow firm i′s lead since it receives monopoly profits in the period that i is sending a 
collusive signal and collusive profits from that point on, which are always higher than the 
inferior equilibrium profits by assumption.   
1  > δ > m∏
∏inf2 ,  may be a strong assumption to place in this model.  It may 
not be possible for firms to reach collusion if they are "stuck" in inferior equilibrium pricing 
since a firm never has a high enough discount factor to take the lead toward the collusive 
outcome.  If , then it is possible for firms to reach a collusive outcome after being in 
coordination failure if δ is high enough for one firm to take the lead and send the signal.  Since 
both firms are symmetric, if δ is high enough to meet this condition requirement then both firms 
are willing to take the lead, and coordination failure never occurs. 
m∏<∏inf2
m∏<∏inf2
                                                 
27 For mathematic derivation, please see 3.8.9 Appendix I. 
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3.7 RESULTS AND CONCLUSION 
Switching costs, whether explicitly set in contracts or implicitly inherent in the industry, bring 
about market inefficiencies when a collusive outcome is not pursued by those within the market.  
Even though the Pareto-optimal collusive equilibrium is attractive to the firm and from overall 
social welfare analysis, it is also problematic since customers retain no surplus. Therefore, each 
equilibrium outcome has benefits and drawbacks.   
In this model of expected profit aggregated to one period of the stage game, there exist 
three symmetric equilibria in a duopolists’ market producing a homogeneous product.  They can 
either collude in prices that keep their customers completely loyal to their product in every 
period, or they can collude in prices that induce entire customer disloyalty.  If the discount rate is 
high enough, then it is profitable for firms to follow a trigger strategy in the multi-stage game to 
induce cooperation with their competitor.  If firms choose pricing that allows some switching to 
take place, then there is a positive dead weight loss to society, and they do not achieve their 
highest possible profits.  On the other hand, customers do not have their entire rent extracted in 
the inferior equilibrium, and therefore they enjoy some of the surplus unlike under the collusive 
outcomes.  Therefore, customers always prefer the inferior equilibrium in this model. 
An interesting extension to this model would change the demand structure for the 
contracted product.  The market in this model has a fixed demand with perfect inelasticity.  To 
extend the model, one should allow for a downward-sloping demand schedule, creating elasticity 
in choosing a firm contract. 
Even though this inferior equilibrium does not seem appealing to the firm in terms of 
profit, it may turn out empirically that it is the pricing scheme that is most often chosen by 
leaders in industries.  It is possible that we see switching behavior that is neither all or nothing on 
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the part of consumers which would lead us to believe that firms are choosing pricing equilibria 
that might be inferior in these markets.  In addition, there could be other factors that induce 
customers to switch providers of a good.  Thus, there needs to be an empirical analysis to track 
cellular telephone market industry to answer these questions along with finding out what really 
happens to prices when the distribution of implicit switching costs decreases. 
If a market makes it easier to switch between producers of a product, does it really make 
that industry more competitive?  This model says yes under the conditions of the inferior 
equilibrium.  An empirical analysis of pricing and customer behavior pre- and post- November 
2003, when portability of cellular telephone numbers became effective, will hopefully be able to 
answer the question of whether these markets are actually exploiting their full power of collusion 
and if making markets more flexible will enhance competition, consumer surplus, and possible 
entry of new firms into the market. 
3.8 APPENDICES 
3.8.1 Appendix A:  
Proposition 1: There exists a collusive equilibrium to this model where an old customer does not 
switch from their current provider at their given contract. 
Mathematic Derivation and Proof: 
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 pi = v - t where v is the maximum reservation price of the indifferent customer 
 
Therefore, Figure 26 follows from these derivations. 
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3.8.2 Appendix B 
Proposition 2: There exists a collusive equilibrium to this model where every old customer 
switches from their current provider at their given contract as seen in Figure 27. 
Mathematic Derivation: 
To best describe this equilibrium, we need to analyze its properties. 
 
It is necessary for y(0) ≥ -1 since this is a Hotelling model of a duopoly where it is 
exogenously given that the distance between the two firms is 1.  The intercept in this model 
cannot exceed the distance set between our duopolists. 
 
This is a necessary condition for our Hotelling model equilibrium to be of the form as 
seen in Figure 27. 
 
    In this scenario, there are increasing returns to a higher qi so the firm wants to set it at 
its highest possible value. 
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    Therefore, qi = v - t where v is reservation value of customer.  Thus, Rij needs to be set 
at its smallest possible value (exactly opposite of the first collusive outcome when qi is set at is 
smallest possible value). 
 
    In terms of expected profit this equilibrium is the same as the first symmetric Pareto- 
optimal equilibrium. 
    
 
Therefore the set up of Figure 27 follows from this derivation.  Everybody switches to 
competitor but pays the breakup fee (v - t). 
Thus, the characterization of this second collusive equilibrium is: 
 
 
Expected profit this equilibrium is the same as the first symmetric Pareto-optimal 
equilibrium.   
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3.8.3 Appendix C 
3.8.3.1 If θ θ−=⇒> tRt ij2  
Proposition:  There exists an equilibrium in this region which is inferior to the collusive 
equilibria from the point of view of the firm. 
The characterization of the inferior equilibrium in case 1 is (for mathematic details see 
below): 
 
Logically, a firm wants to set both positive prices and explicit switching costs in order to 
induce loyalty and have greater profits. Thus, we impose more constrictions on the parameters of 
the model. 
 
With these restrictions in place, the following comparative statics with respect to the 
break fee q and p hold: 
  
Therefore, the explicit switching cost and price for each individual customer varies 
directly with the transportation cost, t, and the uncertainty factor, α, but it varies inversely with θ.  
These comparative static results are counter-intuitive.  One expects a firm to compensate a 
customer who is facing more uncertainty (an increase in α) with lower prices and fees, not higher 
ones as implied by these results.  Similarly, as transportation costs increase, one expects firms to 
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compensate customers whose preferences are less fully aligned with the product they are selling 
to set lower prices.  But the most counter-intuitive result is investigating the effects of θ.  As the 
distribution of consumer implicit switching costs shrinks, then companies increase their contract 
break fees in order to keep their old customers from switching since it costs each of them less in 
inconvenience, opportunity, and learning to do so.  In this equilibrium, as the distribution of 
customer implicit switching costs shrinks, then the market becomes less competitive.  One 
expects prices to fall and switching between providers to increase since it is "less costly" for each 
customer to explore different firms for lower prices when they sign contracts. 
0 θ 
y(0) 
1
Location 
of firms 
i and j 
Customer Implicit Switching Costs 
 
Figure 29: Inferior Symmetric Equilibrium Case 1 
Mathematic Derivation: 
Conditions - θθ −=⇒> tRt ij2  
Returning to the general first order conditions seen Equation 2: 
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 From the point of view of the firm, this equilibrium is inferior to the two collusive 
symmetric equilibria: 
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To get an idea of what the graphic representation of this equilibrium as seen in Figure 29: 
 
3.8.4 Appendix D 
Proposition 3:  There exists an equilibrium in this region which is inferior to the collusive 
equilibria from the point of view of the firm. 
     If tRt ij −=⇒< θ2  
Returning to the general solution in equation 2: 
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This equilibrium is inferior to the previous two because: 
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If n < 
2
rα , θ > 3t, and v satisfies these restrictions, then this is an inferior equilibrium to 
the first two from the point of view of the firm. 
3.8.5 Appendix E 
3.8.5.1 –t < Rij  < t - θ and 2t > θ 
Proposition:  There exists an equilibrium in this region which is inferior to the collusive 
equilibria from the point of view of the firm. 
For mathematic derivation of the equilibrium and to show its inferiority from the point of 
view of the firm, please see below. 
The characterization of the inferior equilibrium in case 3 is: 
 
Just as in Case 1, for p and q to be positive the following conditions must be satisfied: 
 
Also, since the solutions for p and q are the same for Cases 1 and 3, the comparative 
statics hold with respect to θ, α, and t hold. 
Conditions: –t < Rij  < t - θ and 2t > θ 
3.8.5.2 Market Share of Old Customers (1-φi) → the area under the curve in Figure 30 
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 0 θ 
y(0) 
1
Location 
of firms 
i and j 
Customer Implicit Switching Costs 
 
Figure 30: Inferior Symmetric Equilibrium Case 3 
3.8.5.3 Profit Maximization for Case 3 
 
 
3.8.5.4 General First and Second Order Conditions 
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Following similar analysis from the previous cases of the inferior equilibrium, this case is 
also not as desirable to the firm with respect to pricing, fees and profits. 
This equilibrium is inferior to the previous two because: 
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 3.8.6 Appendix F 
3.8.6.1 Case 2 Dominant Inferior Equilibrium 
Proposition: The form of the inferior equilibrium in case 2 dominates the other cases of the 
inferior equilibria.  The reasons for this are, from the point of view of the firm, case 2 brings 
more profit and therefore is the pricing scheme chosen more frequently in a one-shot game. In 
addition, the p and q associated with case 2 bring divergent solutions for cases 1 and 3. 
Under one assumption, I show that case 1 and 3, which are mathematically equivalent, 
never occur in this inferior equilibrium.  Firms always choose the contract set up in case 2 if it 
brings them more expected profit than either case 1 or 3.  If θ > 3t, which is a necessary 
condition for p, q > 0 in case 2, then case 2 dominates the inferior equilibrium.   
Comparing profit of case 2 with case 1: 
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Also, at the solution for p, q, and m for case 2, cases 1 and 3 have divergent solutions and 
therefore are never chosen in equilibrium. 
Since Cases 1 and 3 are the same mathematically, I show that Case 1 has a divergent 
solution. 
Check divergent solution: 
 
 
Therefore if θ > 3t as in case 2, the solution for case 1 is divergent, and case 2 is optimal. 
 135 
3.8.7 Appendix G 
Proposition 7: There exists a positive dead weight loss to society due to switching in the inferior 
equilibrium. 
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3.8.8 Appendix H 
The mathematic derivation for the discount rate necessary for the trigger strategy to be 
profitable: 
 
3.8.9 Appendix I 
The mathematic derivation for the discount rate necessary for one firm to take the lead to get out 
of coordination failure to the collusive outcome: 
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